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Abstract 
Information Technology (IT) has come to be an essential part of carrying out business in our 
technologically advanced world. Unquestionably, a business can practically not survive without IT for 
protracted periods of time. IT failures could present challenges to organisations which, if not 
managed efficiently, could lead to technological disasters from which companies would be hard 
pressed to recover.  
Often companies are complacent about continuity plans, either because their managements have a 
false sense of their ability to recover from a disaster or they believe that the company is immune to 
disasters.  Companies further believe that there is no need to take out Disaster Recovery contracts, 
as they are confident their insurance and maintenance contracts should cover them in case of 
hardware or software failure.   What companies often fail to take into account is that an IT failure 
could extend for long periods unless they have the appropriate mechanisms in place to mitigate such 
failures.  This lack of the awareness of the concept and importance of IT Continuity Management 
encompasses not only monetary losses, but the ramifications could extend to the damage of their 
brand and reputation, resulting in the loss of clients and might have legal repercussions as well.   
The research was undertaken in Company X, one of South Africa’s leading financial services groups.  
Despite a strong Business Continuity ethos inherent in the Company, an analysis of several tests over 
two years highlighted the fact that they experienced recurring issues within the IT Continuity sphere.  
The study was borne out of the need to understand why the same issues were encountered year 
after year, what factors contributed to these issues, and what measures were required to mitigate 
these issues.  The impact of these recurring issues had a negative impact on the disaster recovery 
tests as most of the tests were not successful, on the resources required to perform the tests, and 
on the general perception people had regarding disaster recovery.   
The study analysed the results (reports, audit findings, etc.) of several disaster recovery tests, and 
produced an inventory of the recurring issues experienced during these tests.  Based on these 
results, a questionnaire was developed and distributed to the stakeholders who had a direct 
relationship with IT Continuity.  The findings of the study concluded that human, organisational and 
technological (HOT) factors produce recurring issues which can only be mitigated with strong IT 
Continuity Management practices and principles. The findings are discussed against a newly 
developed conceptual model which depicts the relationships between the HOT factors, recurring 
problems, and effective IT Continuity Management principles. 
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Table of Common Terms and Acronyms 
Term Definition 
Application 
An application is: 
1. A particular customer use to which an information processing system is put - for example, a 
payroll or general ledger application.  
2. A program, set of programs, or software package designed for a particular purpose such as 
payroll or general ledger.  
3. Software that provides Functions that are required by an IT Service. Each Application may be 
part of more than one IT Service. An Application runs on one or more Servers or Clients. See also 
Application Management. (ITIL V3)  
An application may be made up of many different types of data, such as multiple database 
components, data feeds from other applications or other data sources, flat files and electronic 
transmissions. 
Application 
Recovery 
A component of Disaster Recovery that deals with the restoration of business system software and 
data, after the operating system environment has been restored or replaced. 
Battlebox 
 
A secure box containing a variety of documentation / equipment selected to assist with the 
management and control of business continuity.  It is a pro-active 'tool-box' which is readily available 
to control and manage a disruptive event in the organisation. 
BC Business Continuity is an extension of disaster recovery, aimed at allowing an organization to 
continue functioning after (and ideally, during) a disaster, rather than simply being able to recover 
following a catastrophic event. This is accomplished through the deployment of redundant hardware 
and software, the use of fault tolerant systems and data replication techniques as well as a solid 
backup and recovery strategy. 
BCM 
 
Business Continuity Management: An all-encompassing term covering both disaster recovery 
planning and business resumption planning. BCM safeguards the interests of key stakeholders, 
reputation, brand and value-creating activities. The BCM Process involves reducing Risks to an 
acceptable level and planning for the recovery of Business Processes should a disruption to the 
Business occur. BCM sets the Objectives, Scope and Requirements for IT Service Continuity 
Management. 
BCP Business Continuity Plan: A comprehensive written plan to maintain or resume business in the event 
of a disruption. BCP includes both the technology recovery capability (often referred to as disaster 
recovery) and the business unit(s) recovery capability. 
DR 
Disaster recovery is the process, policy and procedure related to preparing for recovery or 
continuation of technology infrastructure critical to an organisation after a natural or human--
induced disaster. Recovery after disaster, such as fire, earthquake, etc., that destroys or otherwise 
disables a system. Disaster recovery techniques typically involve restoring data to a second (recovery) 
system, then using the recovery system in place of the destroyed or disabled application system. See 
also recovery, backup, and recovery system. 
DCN Data Centre North refers to the Remote Data Centre situated in Midrand, Gauteng 
DC Data Centre 
DR Disaster Recovery 
HA High Availability: Systems or applications requiring a high level of reliability and availability. High 
availability systems typically operate 24/7 and usually require built-in redundancy to minimise the 
risk of downtime due to hardware and/or telecommunication failures. 
ITC Information Technology Continuity  
ITSCM IT Service Continuity Management: The process responsible for managing risks that could seriously 
affect IT services. ITSCM ensures that the IT service provider can always provide minimum agreed 
service levels, by reducing the risk to an acceptable level and planning for the recovery of IT services. 
ITSCM should be designed to support business continuity management. 
Maturity Maturity: A measure of the Reliability, Efficiency and Effectiveness of a Process, Function, 
Organisation, etc. The most mature Processes and Functions are formally aligned to Business 
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Objectives and Strategy, and are supported by a framework for continual improvement. 
Recovery The process of rebuilding data after it has been damaged or destroyed. In the case of remote copy, 
this involves applying data from secondary volume copies. 
RPO The point in time to which data must be restored in order to resume processing transactions. RPO is 
the basis on which a data protection strategy is developed. 
Recovery Time The period of time from the disaster declaration to the recovery of the critical functions. 
RTO Recovery Time Objective: The period of time within which systems, applications, or functions must be 
recovered after an outage, e.g. one business day. RTOs are often used as the basis for the 
development of recovery strategies, and as a determinant as to whether or not to implement the 
recovery strategies during a disaster situation. Similar Term: Maximum Allowable Downtime 
SLA A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is part of a service contract where the level of service is formally 
defined. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Globally, there is a growing reliance on IT systems and services. As the world has become more 
technologically advanced, IT has grown and developed to be a central part of conducting business.  
However, this over-dependence on IT has also presented major challenges for organisations. 
Microsoft’s marketing failed spectacularly when the blue screen of death displayed across a diverse 
spectrum of screens for a four-day period in November, 2007 (France 24 News, 2011). There are 
many similar examples of setbacks resulting from IT failure (Nielsen, 2008; Mawson & McConnachie, 
2011). 
The insurance industry has not been excluded from setbacks resulting from IT failure. With the 
changing market place, customer demands and legislative requirements, this industry is increasingly 
forced to harness IT resources to stay in business. Consequently, many information-intensive 
services have been automated, and the internet is used extensively by insurance firms for marketing, 
policy administration, claims settlement and on-line advice (Baur, Birkmaier, & Rüstmann, 2001).  
Obtaining accurate information quickly and efficiently remains an integral component of the 
insurance sector. However, these developments also expose many insurance firms’ risks and IT 
failures or disasters. 
A complete Business Continuity Plan consisting also of an IT Continuity Plan must be in place for an 
organisation to recover after a disaster (Botha & Von Solms, 2003; Woodman & Kumar, 2009).  IT 
Continuity comprises the preparation and planning to make sure that an organisation has the ability 
to survive a disaster, and this includes ensuring the recovery of data, continuing business operations, 
and protecting their reputations (Al-Badi, Ashrafi, Al-Majeeni, & Mayhew, 2009).  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Though the need for continuity plans has been emphasised over the years, not many organisations 
have such plans in place. Risk management practices are often built on retrospection which 
emphasises fault tabulation and calculating the likelihood of failure (Schopp et al., 2006).  A recent 
study by Nielsen (2008), that collected the views of the insurance sector on business continuity, 
confirms this concern. The study revealed that IT is the second highest cause of disruption in the 
organisation.  The study further showed that 25% of the respondents did not have arrangements in 
place for a Business Continuity Plan, and the reasons supplied could generally be summarised as 
“lack of the awareness of the concept and importance of BCM” (Nielsen, 2008, p.1).  While 
interruptions to business are primarily caused by incidences of IT capacity and the loss of 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
Coursework and Dissertation Masters Programme: Information Systems 2010 
 
 
Page 12 of 112 
 
telecommunications (Helms et al., 2006), there exists a real deficit in literature dealing with the 
planning for natural and technological disasters (Perry & Lindell, 2003). 
Consistent with international studies, one of the few studies conducted in South Africa between 
1983 and 2006 revealed that the primary cause of invocations was hardware failure (Stride, 2007).  
More than half of all invocations originated because of computer glitches or the failure of critical 
pieces of hardware.  According to Stride (2007), South African companies frequently believe that 
there is no need to take out Disaster Recovery contracts because they are confident that they are 
protected by comprehensive existing hardware maintenance agreements.  However, the statistics 
collated on companies who had invoked recovery plans do not give credence to this view held by 
companies, as almost all of the companies who invoked recovery plans had maintenance 
agreements in place (Stride, 2007).  This tendency persists today, maintaining its position as the 
leading cause of declared disasters (Stride, 2007; Strydom, 2009; Holmes, 2010). 
In a survey done by AT&T (2008), one third of IT executives were unaware of what their continuity or 
recovery plans comprised, and many admitted that their respective companies had no plans in place. 
A table-top (paper based) simulation held with senior management in Company X (the company in 
which this study was conducted) in June 2011, produced findings consistent with this statement, 
where management knew with certainty that continuity plans exist, but were not familiar with the 
detail, e.g. where the Battle box was kept and what the procedures were to invoke the proceedings 
in the Battle box.  It further revealed that members had varying levels of knowledge of these plans, 
but none had sufficient knowledge about what these continuity plans entailed.   
In AT&T’s study (2008), where th  companies had full-scale data centres, 22% of the participants 
mentioned that their Business Continuity plans required revision (Kadlec & Shropshire, 2009). 
Company X also identified the need to revise their continuity plans. Company X has two data centres 
adjacent to each other, where Data Centre 2 provides redundancy for Data Centre 1, the primary 
data centre. It was thought that High Availability (HA) testing could be performed, where the failover 
capability of the critical systems in Data Centre 1 could be verified by forcing the unavailability of the 
primary nodes to failover to the secondary nodes in Data Centre 2. Therefore, the plan for the 2011 
HA test was to power-down or shut down one data centre completely, so as to emulate a real-life 
scenario of losing a data centre. While preparing for the 2011 HA test, input was invited from all 
stakeholders, namely IT, business, as well as all the service providers, to identify potential issues that 
such a test could encounter.  The issues raised indicated that this kind of test was not feasible, due 
to the fact that the data centre design did not enable full failover capability.  Another problem 
highlighted was that there were legacy systems which had never been re-booted and, because the 
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technology was archaic, it was uncertain how these systems would react when they were to be 
powered-up again. In terms of the preparedness of Company X, it served as clear warning that the 
Company was vulnerable to disaster destroying either data centre, as the other data centre was not 
capable of sustaining full failover capability.  The data centres were originally built in this manner by 
design, with the associated risk the design introduced acceptable to the Company. Whatever the 
initial basis for the design decision, e.g. cost, it does infer doubts about the level of commitment to 
IT Continuity.   
Organisations continue to be complacent on the subject of continuity (Srivantaneeyakul, 2007) and 
this reality has far-reaching consequences. IT Continuity faces various challenges, the most 
conspicuous being that “like life insurance, IT Continuity is a ‘grudge’ insurance” (Regensberg, 2008, 
p.8), and since IT continuity is regarded as an expense which safeguards a company against an event 
which may never happen, it is problematic to demonstrate a Return on Investment (ROI) in IT 
continuity (Vision Solutions, 2009; Strydom, 2009).  Furthermore, IT Continuity does not contribute 
directly to ‘the bottom-line’ (Schopp et al., 2006). Consequently, it increases the efforts to procure 
funding for investments in information availability, e.g. technology resilience, back-ups, etc., and has 
a negative impact on the time and resources which are allocated to continuity efforts.  In the long 
run it amounts to ineffectual continuity plans (Toigi, 2003). In Company X the difficulty in procuring 
funding for continuity efforts is evident in the fact that the Remote Data Centre has approximately 
twenty five percent diminished capabilities as opposed to that of the primary data centres. 
1.3 Purpose 
The issues that were identified during the preparation for the 2011 HA test, led to a re-assessment 
of the test reports of the High Availability (HA) and Remote Data Centre (RDC) tests over the 
previous two years. The analysis indicated a number of recurring issues, where each successive HA 
and RDC test encountered significant problems which resulted in resources spending time trouble-
shooting issues experienced yet not documented in a previous test.   
The time inefficiencies and tests which closed unsuccessfully resulted in situations where acceptance 
sign-off of test results could not be obtained from business areas. Furthermore, the resources who 
participated in these tests (both IT and business) were negative, often uncooperative, and showed 
their irritation at being called away from pressing production issues and other day-to-day 
operational tasks.   
This study therefore investigated those factors contributing to the recurring issues which impede the 
effectiveness (and preparedness) of a disaster recovery unit (specifically in the IT Continuity 
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Management portfolio) in Company X.  The research also aimed at identifying ways by which these 
issues might be mitigated in Company X. 
This study begins with a review of literature on Business Continuity Management and IT Continuity 
Management.  It encompasses a brief overview of definitions and types of disasters.  A section is 
dedicated to a review of the theoretical analysis which explain disasters, the causes of disasters and 
the management required to mitigate disasters.  The study then looks at the methodology used to 
conduct the research, and concludes with a comprehensive discussion on the findings. 
1.4 Research Importance and Benefits 
Company X is dependent on information technology (IT) as it integrates into all functions of the 
organisation. This accentuates the need for data to be continuously available, and the dependency 
on the IT professionals to maintain fully-functional services.  The study was prompted by recurring 
errors experienced during Disaster Recovery tests conducted by Company X which resulted in 
unsuccessful Disaster Recovery testing.  IT Continuity is to enable the Company to restart IT services 
proficiently in the event of a disaster, to minimise prospective economic losses, to reduce possible 
exposure as a result of technological disasters, and to reduce the probability of a disaster, and this 
may be achieved by understanding and mitigating recurring issues.  Moreover, the Company 
benefited from the research because the analysis highlighted risks and proposed methods to 
manage-down the impact of unavoidable disasters. 
The research is also of potential benefit to IS researchers because it could add a layer of 
transparency to IT Continuity issues which is currently unavailable.  According to Stride (2007), South 
African companies are bombarded with statistics from foreign sources, which show causes for 
foreign disasters. However, in Africa, conditions are different from those of our European and 
American counterparts, i.e. South Africa has a less stable infrastructure and perhaps fewer skills 
available to ensure stability. The problem facing South African companies is the unavailability of 
reliable statistics (Stride, 2007), because of the lack of a regulatory body and a single source of 
reliable and unbiased information.  The results of the dissertation could add a level of statistical 
visibility which might be useful to researchers and guide future research.   
Continuity practitioners, e.g. members of the South African Business Continuity Forum (Western 
Cape), may also benefit from the research in the event of their experiencing similar issues within 
their respective organisations. The research highlighted factors which cause IT discontinuity.  It may 
thus enable them to better manage the continuity process by understanding the frustrations 
resources experience with continuity efforts, and understanding the underlying causes of recurring 
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issues.  By understanding the common origins of downtime and how these disasters unfold, 
practitioners are empowered with tools to minimise the impact a disruption may have on mission-
critical functions.  If these tools are implemented properly, it may help reduce the number of overall 
disruptions.  Pre-planned recovery steps will reduce the time taken to make critical decisions (Toigi, 
2003, p.347).  Central to the research is the emphasis on the importance of continuity, which might 
enable these practitioners to build a business proposition to defend the need for continuity within 
their respective organisations.  The theoretical discussion around how disasters are caused and 
managed may allow them to position themselves more favourably in averting disasters and ensuring 
the continuity of their organisations.  
Internal and external IT auditors may also benefit from the research.  IT Continuity in Company X is 
audited every year, and these audits are traditionally based on the issues highlighted during the HA 
and RDC tests.   Therefore, the audit findings are very much a reflection of the reports compiled 
during the tests.  During the past year, when the initial findings from the study became apparent, 
these observations were shared with the auditors, and the scope of the audits broadened, 
highlighting the risk of technical disruptions from which the Company would not recover easily, 
including human risk such as apathy.  The auditing sphere became more than just a reflection of the 
test reports, but became rich in addressing issues which should be of genuine concern to the 
Company, e.g. the fact that, while the Company could recover the IT components in the event of a 
disaster, it was useless if people could not access these systems, and thus the audit highlighted the 
importance of specific business unit recovery measures which needed to be put in place.  Looking 
ahead, the research could aid internal and external IT auditors in their discovery, as well as in 
highlighting the issues with management.  It would also help with putting particular continuity 
management and disaster recovery factors on their radar screens for the next audit. 
A significant contribution of the study is the awareness which the research creates about the 
problem (recurring issues) in the insurance sector.  Generally, there are very few studies of this kind 
in existence and, in fact, this could well be the first of its kind in South Africa.  None of the research 
undertaken for the Literature Review yielded any previous such study. 
Organisations which do not have a comprehensive continuity plan in place have a diminished 
prospect of continuing to conduct business after a disaster (Wong, 2006).   Consistent with this 
finding, a study done confirmed that forty three percent of companies which are subjected to a 
disaster will not pull through, while ninety percent which lose data during a disaster will cease 
operation within two years of the event; eighty percent of organisations without a Disaster Recovery 
Plan (DRP) will go out of business within twelve months of experiencing a fire or flood (Al-Badi et al., 
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2009).  These statistics confirm that there is a need for raising Disaster Recovery and Business 
Continuity Planning awareness. 
1.5 Research Motivation 
My motivation for completing this research is to fulfil, on a personal level, an understanding of the 
recurring issues currently experienced in the field of IT Continuity.  I currently hold the portfolio of IT 
Continuity in the company I work for, and thus the subject is of specific interest to me. 
IT Continuity faces various challenges, the most conspicuous being that it is problematic to 
demonstrate a Return on Investment (ROI) since IT Continuity is regarded as an expense which 
safeguards the company against an event which may never happen.  My experience has been that 
people are loath to participate in continuity efforts because they do not see the benefit, or rather, 
they are only able to experience the benefit of continuity plans in the face of a disaster and, because 
of the lack of huge scale disasters, they are unable to align their mental paradigm with the effort 
associated with continuity.  Thus the motivation in undertaking such a study was in part to 
understand what was required to build a value proposition for IT Continuity within Company X.  The 
consequence of not being able to prove ROI increases the efforts to procure funding for continuity 
efforts, and has a negative impact on the time and resources which are allocated to such efforts 
(Toigi, 2003).  I am often told resources cannot attend to IT Continuity efforts due to more urgent 
and pressing day-to-day operational tasks.  This becomes even more problematic when the 
resources are contractors and their time is billed to a particular project:  no-one wants to foot the 
bill for these resources spending time on IT Continuity efforts. 
The motivation in undertaking thus study also stems from the confusion in accountability and 
responsibility for IT Continuity within the Company. Business sees it as an IT responsibility (because 
they are responsible for the hardware and the software), while IT sees it as a business responsibility 
(given that business controls the expenditure on IT Continuity efforts).  It is my belief that IT 
Continuity is the concern and obligation of the whole Company, and necessitates the buy-in and 
sincere commitment from every single manager, regardless of rank.  IT cannot do its Business 
Continuity Planning in isolation from the rest of the organisation. 
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2. Literature Review 
The literature review commences with a brief definition of Business Continuity and IT Continuity, 
with the aim of clarifying any unambiguity which may exist and to elucidate the core role of IT to 
business. An overview on disasters is given, after which a number of theoretical models on disasters, 
and how various models describe the formulation of disasters, are discussed.   The role of the 
concepts of Risk and Time-in disasters is also described.  The attributes or causes of technological 
disasters are reviewed, and this section concludes with a few disaster management models to 
manage, contain and mitigate disasters. The aim is to give a background so that we can better 
understand the recurring issues within Company X that impede effective IT continuity management, 
what causes them, and how they can be mitigated.   
2.1 Business Continuity Management 
Business Continuity Management (BCM) is defined by the British Standards Institution’s Code of 
Practice for Business Continuity Management (BS 25999-1) as “a holistic management process that 
identifies potential threats to an organisation and the impacts to business operations that those 
threats, if realised, might cause; and which provides a framework for building organisational 
resilience with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key 
stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-creating activities” (Woodman & Kumar, 2009, p.3). 
Business Continuity Planning (BCP), one of the processes executed under BCM, is the process of 
planning for the recovery of overall business operations in the event of a business interruption (Best 
Computer Practices, 2009). BCP is, therefore, “the pre-planning which focuses on business processes 
(rather than IT infrastructure) required to ensure that a company can continue to exist despite a 
crisis, thereby mitigating the impact of the crisis” (Toigi, 2003, p.457). 
IT Continuity (ITC) is also a subset of Business Continuity Management, with the primary focus on 
the pre-emptive and reactive procedures to restore the IT infrastructure which is used to deliver IT 
Services (Toigi, 2003, p.3), i.e. it comprises the activities which ensure that IT Services can carry on in 
the event of a serious incident (Hammond, 2007).  It consists of the procedures in preparing for, 
establishing, testing and implementing the courses of action required to reduce the effects of service 
unavailability on customers, in accordance with service level agreements (Hinca, 2006).  The intent 
of ITC is to anticipate and reduce the impact of protracted system unavailability by means of 
“developed, pre-defined, documented and tested continuity procedures” (Hiles, 2011, p.229). 
Information Technology Disaster Recovery Planning (ITDRP), a subset of ITC, plans for those activities 
which the Company must undertake to increase its ability to recover IT systems and services 
following a disaster, and this includes IT disaster identification and notification, preparation of 
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organisational members, IT services analysis, recovery processes, backup procedures, offsite storage, 
and maintenance (Kadlec & Shropshire, 2009).   It describes and lists the actions a company must 
perform in reaction to an IT-related crisis (Toigi, 2003). Typical activities would encompass the 
retrieval and salvage of data, hardware and software, i.e. those steps required for the recovery of 
critical business operations after a disaster.  Simply put, BCP are those endeavours which take place 
before an incident occurs, and Disaster Recovery (DR) is what happens during and after the incident 
(Al-Badi et al., 2009). 
There are no precise and clear distinctions between the definitions; however, the inter-relationship 
of the defined processes, with the introduction of a definition for contingency planning, are depicted 
in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. BCP and DRP Relationship (Botha & Von Solms, 2003) 
The smaller circles labelled A to I represent various business processes. These processes are all 
dependent on services and infrastructure provided by the IT Department, depicted by the innermost 
circle, labelled IT (Figure 1). Some of these processes are also dependent on others, as depicted by 
the overlapping circles. The outermost circle represents Business Continuity planning, a combination 
of the disaster recovery plan for the IT department and the contingency plans for these various 
business processes (Botha & Von Solms, 2003). The present study focuses on the central element of 
Figure 1, i.e. IT, and how failure to manage its continuity may adversely impact on other 
organisational activities.  For the purposes of this study, we will continue with the term IT Continuity 
(ITC). 
2.2 Disasters 
A disaster is generically defined as a severe interruption of the functioning of society, producing 
extensive human, material or environmental losses which surpass the capacity of the affected 
society to survive while depending on its own resources (Shaluf, 2007a).  From an organisational 
perspective, Toigi (2003, p.4) defines a disaster as the unplanned interruption of normal business 
processes resulting from the interruption of the IT infrastructure components used to support them.  
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This includes information systems and networks and their hardware and software components, as 
well as the data itself.   
Three types of disasters can be identified, namely natural disasters, man-made disasters and a 
hybrid between natural and man-made disasters (Figure 2). Natural disasters are those catastrophic 
events resulting from natural hazards which can originate internally beneath the earth’s surface, 
externally (topographical), as well as weather-related (meteorological/hydrological) and biological 
phenomena. Natural disasters are beyond human control and are often termed an “Act of God” 
(Shaluf, 2007a, p.687).  Man-made disasters, also known as technological or socio-technical 
disasters, are those disastrous events which arise from human decisions.  Hybrid disasters are an 
amalgam of human decisions and natural forces. Regardless of the type, all disasters have a common 
denominator, which is the severity of their impact on people, property, and the environment (Shaluf 
et al., 2002, 2003b, 2003c; Shaluf, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). 
 
Figure 2. Diagrammatic representation of the types of disasters (compiled fromToigi, 2003, p.3; Shaluf et al., 2002, 
2003b, 2003c; Shaluf, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) 
 
A disaster is an unexpected incident which impacts on the critical processes of the organisation 
(Hinca, 2006).  Typically, the nature of such an event is that it disrupts business-as-usual to the 
extent that monetary losses can be incurred, and these losses can be quantified (Maiwald & Sieglein, 
2002).  From a business continuity perspective, a disaster is declared when an event or chain of 
events results in the inability of an organisation to provide critical business functions for a period of 
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time, and which causes the company to move from using standard operating procedures to 
employing its disaster recovery procedures (Wong, 2006). 
This present study focuses on man-made (also known as technological) disasters, which range from 
the accidental deletion of a file to recovery from the loss of a building that houses the data centre 
along with the IT infrastructure, e.g. due to a hurricane or flooding, etc. Other examples of IT 
services which could be disrupted include internet connectivity, telecommunications, data storage 
and processing, hardware, software, data, human resources, and utilities (Kadlec & Shropshire, 
2009). 
2.3 Disaster Models 
A number of theoretical models exist which aim to explain how disasters are formed. Models are 
useful in gaining insight to complex matters.  
2.3.1 Deterministic Models 
Determinism assumes that reality conforms to cause and effect relationship, where disaster is 
classified as the end result (Gibb, et.al, 2002).  There is a general philosophical theory which states 
that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could 
happen. William Heinrich posited the Sequences-of-events theory in 1931, which purports that a 
disaster is considered to be the outcome of a sequence of events, i.e. the conclusion of a sequence 
of events.  In this model, events preceding the accident happen linearly, in a fixed order, and the 
accident itself is the last event in the sequence.  The deterministic model is also known as the 
‘domino model’ for its depiction of an accident as the ‘end point’ in a string of falling dominoes, 
which holds that an accident or incident is an event or chain of events resulting in the inability of the 
organisation to provide IT services.  In this linear model, events occur akin to that of having a domino 
effect, i.e. when one of the dominoes falls, it triggers the next one, and the next, but that removing a 
key factor such as an unsafe condition or an unsafe act prevents the start of the chain reaction. In 
the deterministic model, a disaster is depicted as the last of the sequence of events.  The concept is 
widely used in risk analysis, fault-tree analysis, probabilistic risk assessments, Petri nets, critical path 
models, etc. (Hollnagel, 2008; Ho, 2010).   
Deterministic models with a technological interpretation espouse the theory that technology is an 
objective external force which has a deterministic influence on humans and organizations (Leavitt & 
Whisler, 1958; Blau et al., 1976; Hiltz & Johnson, 1990), i.e. technology governs what we do, and 
transforms our social activities.  The assumption was that the adoption of technology would bring 
about inevitable changes at the organisational level, e.g. by enabling decentralisation or 
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centralisation. Decentralisation, among other benefits, allows organisations to take advantage of 
division of labour by sharing decision-making across the organisation, coordinating efforts and 
communicating.  Decentralisation comes with a cost, and may also present challenges which could 
lead to disasters, e.g. by federating many business processes, it also has an impact on creating 
schisms in decision-making or processes, which could result in duplicating technology procurement 
efforts.  The adoption of technology could, however, also enable centralisation, e.g. by consolidating 
various business data into a single warehouse would ensure that technology, e.g. monitoring and 
alerting software, is standardised across all the business units which share the warehouse, thus 
reducing effort and cost.  Orlikowski (1996) posited, however, that the centralisation of technology 
may also enable disasters, e.g. migrating everything to a single warehouse would create a single 
point of failure, where the unavailability of the warehouse due to a disaster would have an impact 
on several business processes. 
Many have progressed to developing models based on this notion alone.   However, the danger is 
that, by focusing on technology only, systems or models are developed that have limited 
consideration of other organisational and socio-technological aspects. Consequently, these 
technology-based models and control systems break down, resulting in disasters.  The shortfall of 
the deterministic model is that it looks at disasters at the end of a sequence of technological events; 
hence it is not cognizant of the organisational and social aspects that take place concurrently with 
technological aspects, and which can also contribute to disasters.   An example is the loss of NASA’s 
Mars Polar Lander, where spurious compu er signals (during the deployment of the landing legs) 
were interpreted by the on-board software as an indication that the craft had landed, and hence 
shut the engines down prematur ly, causing the spacecraft to crash into the Mars surface (Lloyd, 
2009). The landing leg extension and software executed according to specification; however the 
accident materialised from unforeseen interactions between leg deployment and descent-engine 
control software (David, 2005).   
2.3.2 Contingency Models 
In contrast to the deterministic viewpoint, contingency models hold that the structure of an 
organisation depends upon (is ‘contingent’ upon) the kind of task performed rather than upon some 
universal principles which apply to all organisations (Perrow, 1967).  The theory embraces the 
assertion that technology influences are mediated by contextual variables and, as such, are a 
component of a broader system of organisational changes. While IT can impact corporate strategy 
internally, regarding its competitiveness and business portfolio IT does not independently influence 
organisations (Perrow, 1981; Wunnava & Ellis, 2009).  Many socio-technical studies which have 
examined contextual factors such as environmental uncertainty, size, management objectives or 
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political strategies, have yielded insight into the fact that the technological impact on organisations 
is contingent on other forces in the organisation. IT impact on the organisation is contingent upon 
powerful organisational actors, who can make decisions that suit their short-term or temporary 
views. However, these decisions could prove catastrophic in a disaster situation (Bharadwaj, 2000). 
For example, two data centres intended for high availability, built next to each other, provide 
redundancy to each other in mitigating the most obvious risks such as power failure, but should a 
disaster occur which affects the entire area, both data centres are vulnerable and exposed to the 
same issues simultaneously. 
2.3.3 Systemic model 
In the systemic model (also known as the man-made disaster theory), disasters are perceived to 
emerge from a confluence of conditions, occurrences and/or activities, i.e. a combination of a 
number of elements which work together and which yield disaster as a combined effect (Dekker et 
al., 2008).  This model is contrary to deterministic theory (sequence-of-event theory) which is rooted 
in Newtonian visions of cause and effect, i.e. Newton's third law of motion, which states that for 
every action (force) in nature there is an equal and opposite reaction (Louth, 2011). Numerous 
theorists have developed disaster models to control the effect (sometimes called excess energy), e.g. 
airbags in the car, security controls, etc. However, to conceptualise disaster or risk, as energy to be 
contained or managed using barriers or counter-measures, does not explain the organisational and 
socio-technical factors behind system breakdown.  Because of such limitations, researchers such as 
Turner started to focus on systemic views, e.g. the man-made disaster model (MacIntosh-Murray & 
Choo, 2002).  
According to Barry Turner, incidents materialise from conditions and occurrences, each necessary 
and usually related with the pursuit of success which, when combined, are sufficient to trigger 
failure instead (Turner, 1976; Turner, 1994; Dekker et al., 2008).  Thus, Turner looked systemically at 
more than just the end result: he looked at other elements which contribute to disaster, and 
acknowledged that disaster was not an end result; instead, disaster was a gradual build-up of 
conditions, occurrences and/or activities over time. Turner (1976, 1994) explored a succession of 
‘man-made disasters’, and observed that they had been preceded by a legacy of warnings which had 
been disregarded, and which, had they been acted on, would have obviated a disaster.  He then 
postulated a theory that disasters were ‘failures of foresight’, and began a process to explain why 
warnings go unnoticed (Choo, 2005; Downer, 2010).  Turner concluded that disasters were neither 
chance events nor acts of God, nor were they triggered by a few events or unsafe human acts 
immediately before the occurrence.  He postulated that man-made disasters frequently commence 
with small, ostensibly trivial, operational and managerial decisions, after which there was an 
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incubation period. Over a long period problems accumulated, and the organisation’s view of itself 
and how it managed its risks, grew increasingly at odds with the real state of affairs, until this mis-
match actually exploded into the open in the form of an accident (Dekker et al., 2008). Turner’s 
Model (Figure 3) focused on describing the sequence of events associated with the development of 
technological (man-made) disasters (Shaluf et al., 2003b). 
Stage I in Figure 3 is the notionally-normal starting point where the company and employees adhere 
to standards and norms, and operations function as normal.  Stage II relates to the incubation period 
where errors occur and accumulate.  Stage III relates to events which serve as warnings which, if not 
mitigated, lead to stage IV, the onset of a disaster.  The rescue and salvage stage (Stage V) refers to 
activities which bring the organisation to a point where it may resume basic operational functioning, 
and Stage VI is where activities are focused on attaining full operational business functioning.   
Stage I: Notionally Normal 
Starting points.  
Culturally accepted beliefs and the 
precautionary norms set out in laws 
and codes of practice
Stage II: Incubation Period.  
Accumulation of unnoticed set of events 
which are ad odds with accepted beliefs / 
norms for their avoidance
Stage III: Precipitating Event. 
Brings attention to itself and transforms 
the general perceptions in Stage II
Stage IV: Onset.  
The immediate consequences of the 
collapse of cultural precautions become 
apparent
Stage V: Rescue and Salvage. 
First stage adjustment: the immediate 
post-collapse situation as recognised in ad-
hoc adjustments, which permit the work of 
resuce and salvage to start 
Stage VI: Full cultural adjustment.  
An inquiry or assement is carried out and 
the beliefs and precautionary norms are 
adjusted to fit the newly gained 
understanding of the world
 
Figure 3. Diagrammatic representation of Turner’s Model (compiled from Turner (1976) and Shaluf et al. 2003a). 
Turner’s model is useful in that it has the potential to highlight insidious risk factors which are more 
difficult to identify, and which may remain hidden until disaster (false assumptions about reality) 
strikes (Sullivan & Beach, 2003).  It may further serve to specify organisational safety and security 
cultures, e.g. by highlighting or exposing vulnerabilities. It guides the organisation into taking specific 
precautions which, if done consistently, yield a culture or norm which is concerned with providing a 
safe environment (Genserik, 2009). 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
Coursework and Dissertation Masters Programme: Information Systems 2010 
 
 
Page 24 of 112 
 
2.4 Importance of Time and Risk 
The concepts of risk and time are two vital factors in defining an integrative IT continuity approach.  
Risk comprises two factors, namely, the likelihood of the occurrence of an incident, and the impact 
the incident has when it does occur. These two factors determine the mitigating measures which 
should be in place to address the IT risk (Helms et al., 2006).   Time is mentioned as a by-product in 
Turner’s model; however, the concept of time is important because it is the management of disaster 
stages over time, one of the central themes of the causes of disaster and its mitigation. Time is a 
multiplier of loss, e.g. the longer a company is without critical and vital business functions, the 
greater the costs of the outage, and the less likely the possibility of full recovery (Nelson, 2000).  An 
understanding of how disasters unfold within the specific phases associated with time will aid the 
planning and corrective actions an organisation must put in place to mitigate or manage down its 
vulnerabilities.   
Disasters or incidents follow typical patterns (MacIntosh-Murray & Choo, 2002).  These patterns can 
be depicted graphically (Figure 4), with the aspect of time being divided into four phases, plotted on 
the X-axis, and operational level (expressed as a percentage of full operational levels) plotted on the 
Y-axis (Helms et al., 2006).   
 
Figure 4. Disaster time-frame (Helms et al., 2006) 
 
T0 -T1 represents normal operations (pre-disaster stage). T1-T2 shows the effect of an event or 
incident which negatively impacts on the operations of the organisation.  If the impact of the 
incident is of such a nature that the operational level falls below minimal operational level (also 
known as threshold level) then business operations will cease (triggering event).   T2-T3 depicts the 
effect of those activities which are required to return business operations to above the threshold 
level so that business activities may resume (disaster stage), and T3-T4 refers to efforts and activities 
which are required to return business activities to a normal state corresponding to that prior to the 
incident (post-disaster stage).   
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The advantage of looking at disasters in time-related stages is to grant the continuity practitioners, 
researchers, and IT resources the ability to understand more clearly the processes and actions which 
influence each stage.  Depicting the time-frame graphically yields the benefit of understanding 
where an organisation is at any given time, as well as mapping the consequences of not taking action 
on time.  Phase T0-T1 shows that if the company is in the pre-disaster phase, actions required to 
mitigate threats should be preventive in nature, i.e. precautionary measures taken to prevent a 
threat from becoming an incident (e.g. normal operational activities such as backups and restores 
are required to keep the organisation functioning).  Phase T1-T2 illustrates the incident stage where 
the focus should be on detection, i.e. procedures required to diagnose an incident as soon as it 
happens, e.g. monitoring the backups, and the alerting processes which should be in place should a 
backup fail.  Phase T2-T3 portrays the damage segment in the time flow, where repression, i.e. the 
measures to respond to an incident in the early stages to limit the damage, and corrective actions to 
overcome the incident and recover the damage, are performed.  Phase T3-T4 is concerned with the 
Recovery stage following the incident, where evaluation and correction measures are put in place to 
increase the amount of knowledge about the incident, e.g. a post-mortem or a root cause analysis of 
the event.    
Lengthy incubation periods (Figure 3, stage II) have the potential to conceal warning signs vital to 
risk analysis in large-scale systems, and may signify that latent i.e. difficult to notice, embedded, 
failures can subsist unobserved in systems for extended time periods, diminishing the effective 
windows of opportunity in which interven ion and risk mitigation measures might be introduced 
(Shaluf, 2008).  The Ibrahim-Razi Model (Shaluf et al., 2003c) focuses on the incubation stage and 
breaks it down into various phases (Figure 5).     
 
Figure 5. Summary of the Ibrahim-Razi model (Shaluf et al., 2003, 2003c; Shaluf, 2008). 
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In the Ibrahim-Razi Model the disaster pre-condition is known as the Major Hazard Installation (MHI) 
comprising phases that precede the technological disaster (the trigger event in Figure 4). 
Phase 1 contains the inception of errors which, if unmanaged, accumulate over time (Phase 2).  
Warning systems will highlight the impending disaster (Phase 3) and, if corrected, the organisation 
will continue to operate normally.  However, if the warnings are ignored and no corrective actions 
are put in place to fix the errors (Phase 5), an action or mistake will be the trigger to the disaster 
(Phase 6).  The organisation consequently finds itself in the disaster stage or emergency state (Phase 
7).  If the company has the relevant IT Continuity strategies and plans in place and has made the 
necessary preparations, it will have the required defences to deal with the emergency and return to 
a normal state of operations.  If, however, the company has made no plans or taken no disaster 
precautionary efforts, the disaster can plunge the operational levels below the minimal operational 
level (X1 in Figure 4), and operations can cease. 
Using disaster models can be beneficial to companies, as they provide the ability to look at complex 
events in a simplified manner by differentiating between critical elements.  Theoretical models also 
have the ability to facilitate deeper insight into the situation, and can therefore aid the planning 
process and the comprehensive completion of disaster management plans (Kelly, 1999). This is 
especially important because reacting to disasters often has to take place within constrained time 
limits.   
Compared with the Turner Model (Figure 3) which describes disaster as a sequence of stages which  
included  pre-disaster  or  crisis  conditions  as  part  of  the  escalation  or creation  of  the  crisis  
itself, the Ibrahim-Razi Model is more comprehensive in that it illustrates the actions and reactions 
within a company which could lead to disasters.  The Ibrahim-Razi Model is more practical, because 
it concisely breaks down the disaster timeline into a set of processes which must be managed.  The 
Ibrahim-Razi Model, however, does not make provision for the causes of errors or the actions which 
a company may undertake to manage the errors before it reaches the disaster-impending stage. 
2.5 Causes of Technological Disasters 
IT Continuity as a discipline is ultimately concerned with those mitigating activities that prevent 
disaster-causing errors to accumulate. The typical major accident does not come into existence fully 
formed.  It comprises preconditions, also known as pathogens, which fall into place over an 
extended period of time (Werlinger et.al, 2009).  Factors external to an organisation, such as 
economic, environmental, political and social factors, are known to cause technological disasters. 
However, factors internal to an organisation, such as human, organisational and technological (HOT) 
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factors, can also combine and act together in various permutations during the incubation period 
(Figure 3, stage II) to yield large-scale incidents and technological disasters (Shrivastava et.al, 1988) 
(Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Human, organisational and technological (HOT) factors which cause technological disasters (compiled from 
Shrivastava et.al., 1988; Shaluf et al., 2003c; Werlinger et.al., 2009) 
A multiplicity of minor causes, misperceptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications 
accumulate unnoticed during the incubation period (Figure 3, stage II).  They remain in place in the 
organisation, ready to contribute to a major failure unless something happens to neutralise them by 
bringing them out into the open.  Until the point at which they combine and react in undesirable 
ways, misconceptions about the world which such pathogens embody provide elements which are 
available to contribute to a disaster.  They constitute an accident waiting to happen.  If they are not 
uncovered, the pre-conditions are brought together by a trigger which sets off a disaster (Turner,  
1994; MacIntosh-Murray & Choo, 2002; Downer, 2010). 
Human error (Human factors, Figure 6) is defined as the inappropriate or undesirable human 
decision or behaviour that reduces, or has the potential for reducing, effectiveness, safety, or system 
performance.  It comprises, but is not limited to, employee morale, number of people staffing each 
unit, quality of training, and the manager’s experience.  Organisational inadequacies (Organisational 
factors, Figure 6) comprise policy failures, insufficient resources allocations, strategic business 
Human Factors
Organisational 
Factors
Technological 
Factors
Technological 
Disasters
Operator Error
Managerial Error
Policy Failures
Inadequate resource 
allocation
Strategic business 
pressure
Neglect of safety 
issues
Communication 
failures
Misperceptions of the 
extent and nature of 
hazards
Inadequate 
emergency plans
Cost pressures which 
curtail safety
Lack of Technical 
Integrity
Poor  / Faulty Design
Poor Processes and 
Competencies Inadequate 
Communication and 
development of design
Fabrication, erection  and 
testing of design not 
match original intent
Defective equipment, 
Faulty Technical 
Procedures
Lack of awareness / 
knowledge / experience
Low morale
High work load due to 
poor staffing
Lack of continuity of the 
management
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pressure leading to a neglect of safety issues, communication breakdowns, etc. Technological factors 
(Figure 6) enkindle the processes and competencies which are necessary to make sure that 
communication and development of that design, fabrication, erection and testing match the original 
intent and intended use (Shaluf et al., 2003c). 
The HOT Factor Model (Figure 6) excludes causes of disasters which are external to the organization, 
such as environmental factors (‘Acts of God’), political factors (riots, etc.), social factors (poverty, 
etc.) and legislation factors.  It is a useful model when looking at internal causes of technological 
disasters.  As this study was concerned only with technological (man-made) disasters in the IT 
sphere, the model is both relevant to the study and an appropriate means of determining the factors 
relevant to IT continuity within an organisation. 
2.5.1 Human Factors 
Human factors (Figure 6) which comprise poor control procedures, failure to recognise an incident 
for what it is, and freezing at crucial decision-making processes, take human operator and 
managerial errors into account (Richardson, 1994).  Human error accounts for 56% of all total system 
downtime and data loss, and the financial services, manufacturing, telecommunications and 
healthcare sectors are more at risk than any other (Continuity Central, 2010).   
All complex technologies are involved in some form of production, and there are five basic elements 
to any productive system:  
1. decision makers, e.g. architects;  
2. line managers, i.e. departmental specialists who implement the operational strategies such 
as training, sales, maintenance, finance, etc.; 
3. pre-conditions, e.g. a skilled and knowledgeable workforce; 
4. productive activities, i.e. the temporal and spatial coordination of mechanical and human 
activities needed to deliver the right product at the right time; and  
5. defences, i.e. where the productive activities encompass exposure to threats, both the 
human and mechanical elements of the system must be made available with adequate 
safeguards to prevent injury, damage or costly outages (Reason, 1990).  
Therefore fallible decisions are part of the design and management processes, and the focus should 
be on ensuring that any adverse consequences are detectable and recoverable.  Another school of 
thought highlights the fact that any human errors that may have finally triggered the accident, are 
themselves the result of problems that have been brewing inside the organisation for a much longer 
period of time (Dekker et al., 2008). 
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Prior to a disaster there are many clues which may indicate that a disaster is looming. Examples are 
management systems that are failing to keep up with operational realities, e.g. toleration of gaps in 
important information; and a failure to reveal information, or information being available only to 
members of the organisation who do not understand its significance. Recurring communication 
issues between diverse specialist departments may stockpile and contribute to a major failure.  Rigid 
hierarchies may serve to impede the course of information and contribute to the wide range of 
problems which build up during an accident incubation period (Turner, 1994; Shaluf et al., 2002b, 
2003c; Shaluf, 2007a, 2008). 
People’s individual actions are directed by their perceptual paradigms of how things work, i.e. 
deeply ingrained assumptions, generalisations, or even pictures or images that influence how they 
understand the world and how they take action.  These practices include retention of knowledge 
which may be out of date and which may no longer be applicable, acceptance of defective sources of 
information at face value, failure to notice critical information due to poor communication within 
the workplace, human performance errors, inexperience and cognitive bias (Chapman, 2005).  It is 
the unnoticed accumulation of these "many human errors and failures, too much reliance on an 'old 
boy' network and some very ill-defined and poor communications” which can lead to technological 
disasters (Turner, 1976, p.387; Downer, 2010). 
When looking at the human factors which can cause recurring problems, several additional factors 
come into play such as low morale, high workloads due to poor staffing, lack of awareness and/or 
knowledge and experience (Figure 6).  The increasing complexity, rapid change, and growing size of 
technical systems affects the capability of designers to predict and supply the means to control the 
relevant disturbances to an acceptable degree of completeness, and consequently the ability of the 
operating staff to cope with unforeseen and rare disturbances (Rasmussen et al., 1990).   These 
errors are exacerbated by the very human tendency to blame individuals for bad outcomes.  Blame 
is the most tenacious and the most pervasive of harmful effects upon organisational safety (Reason 
et al., 2001).  
The attribution of error to an individual’s personality, ability or attitude (careless, silly, stupid, 
thoughtless, irresponsible, incompetent, or reckless) is one of the chief reasons why people are so 
ready to accept the phrase human error as an explanation rather than as something that needs 
further explanation (Funder, 1987; Maruna & Mann, 2006).  Just world propositions are based on 
the belief that bad things happen only to bad people and further drives the blame cycle (Maes, 
1994).  The hindsight bias—or the knew-it-all-along effect—is the universal human tendency to see 
past events as somehow more foreseeable than they actually were (Sanna et al., 2002).  These 
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psychological factors are perpetuated in the organisation by two principles, namely the principle of 
least effort, i.e. human error is the cause of the mishap and hence any further investigation is not 
required; and the principle of administrative convenience, i.e. restricting the search to the actions of 
those directly in contact with the mishap. It is therefore possible to limit the blame accordingly and 
thus minimise any institutional responsibility (Reason et al., 2001). 
Disasters are caused by the adversarial concurrence of many causal factors, each one necessary, but 
singly insufficient to achieve the catastrophic outcome. Although errors and violations of those at 
the immediate human-system interface often feature predominantly in the post-accident 
investigations, it is evident that these 'front-line' operators are rarely the principal instigators of 
system breakdown. Their part is often to provide just those local triggering conditions necessary to 
manifest systemic weaknesses created by fallible decisions made earlier in the organisational and 
managerial spheres (Reason, 1990; Tetzlaff, 2001). 
2.5.2 Organisational Factors 
Organisational failures (Figure 6) look at the organisational shortcomings which contribute to a crisis, 
and include inadequate resource allocation, strategic business pressures leading to a neglect of 
safety issues, communication failures, misperceptions of the extent and nature of hazards, 
inadequate continuity plans and cost pressures (Richardson, 1994; Shaluf et al., 2003c).  The 
organisational domain addresses those factors which impact on the organisation as a whole, e.g. 
policies and practices, organisational culture, planning and staff participation. 
Failures and near misses can be seen as occasions for shame or as incidents to be covered up, but 
they can also be understood as learning opportunities (Turner, 1994). This latter view is the one best 
suited for the development of highly reliable operations and for the prevention of disasters.  An 
attitude of openness and a no-blame culture make it possible to treat near-miss incidents as 
providing information which may improve standards of operation or uncover failure preconditions 
before they lead to major disasters.  In a corporate culture of this kind, there is a greater likelihood 
that covert ‘pathogens’ will be uncovered and dealt with before they lead to large scale failure.  In 
such a climate, sensibly designed safety audits can also help to improve management practices 
Turner, 1994). Nelson (2000) reinforced this idea and stated that learning is possible from incidents, 
but only in an environment which is tolerant of people making mistakes.  It is important that lessons 
are transferred to future incidents, the effectiveness of which may be measured in non-events, i.e. 
disaster potentials that have been minimised or eliminated. 
Common causal features of organisational disasters (Figure 7) are: (a) rigidities in institutional 
beliefs, which create a particular culture; (b) distracting decoy phenomena; (c) neglect of outside 
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complaints; (d) multiple information-handling difficulties; (e) exacerbation of the hazards by 
strangers; (f) failure to comply with regulations; and (g) a tendency to minimise emergent danger 
(Turner, 1976, 1994; Shaluf et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Shaluf, 2007a, 2008). 
 
Figure 7. Common causal factors of organisational factors (compiled from Turner, 1976; Shaluf et al., 2003a, 2003b, 
2003c; Shaluf, 2007a, 2008)) 
 
The ‘it won’t happen to us’ syndrome prevalent in large companies is an example of ‘rigidities in 
institutional beliefs’ posited by Turner (1976, 1994).  It is this belief, often held by senior 
management, that the organisation is safe from crisis, which relegates contingency planning to the 
realm of the unimportant, where preparedness to contain or prevent a crisis is negligible (Nelson, 
2000).  Bias affects patterns of decision-making and affects the amount of effort taken to solve a 
problem.  Historic and institutional precedents are reinforced by sets of industrial beliefs which give 
little consideration to preparedness.  A situation is therefore reinforced where the perception of 
potential dangers is dimmed (Turner, 1976).  Once this failure of perception is created and 
structured, it is reinforced by a set of institutional, cultural (or sub-cultural beliefs) and their 
associated practices (Turner, 1976; Shaluf et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). 
All organisations develop within themselves elements of continuous culture which are related to 
their tasks and their environment (Turner, 1976).  A portion of the success of organisations 
originates from their ability to develop such cultures; however, this very attribute also carries the 
risk of a collective blindness to issues of great magnitude.  The danger is that some vital factors may 
have been excluded from the framework of bounded rationality.  When a widespread and deep-
rooted set of beliefs is present within a company, these beliefs sway and guide the viewpoints and 
opinions of the employees.  They may influence the decision-making processes and shape 
organisational arrangements to the point where it becomes a vicious, self-reinforcing circle, e.g. 
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where an issue is detrimental, but the belief is held that the area is not important or problematic 
(Turner, 1971; Shaluf, 2007a, 2008). 
In looking at past disasters, Turner (1976, p.384) proposed that the main causal factors of the 
disasters occurred when “a large complex problem, the limits of which were difficult to specify, was 
being dealt with by a number of groups and individuals usually operating in separate organisations 
and separate departments within organisations”.  This translates to the fact that the necessary 
knowledge about the procedures is available, but is circulated to a small number of people; hence, 
the nature of the problem is not generally appreciated. 
Self-perception also plays a role in technological disasters (Gopalakrishnan & Okada, 2007), i.e. the 
perception of the role a department may have in terms of its contribution to preparedness.   An 
example of this is that the business may relegate the responsibility of IT Continuity to the IT 
department because they perceive themselves not to be technically inclined. Therefore, they do not 
fully participate in IT Continuity testing, or they are lax about creating test matrices for disaster 
recovery testing. 
Past disasters which have been analysed, have shown how individuals outside the principal 
organisations highlighted dangers which were dismissed with ambiguous or misleading statements, 
or subjected to public relations exercises. Such dismissals were based on the assumption that the 
organisations knew better than outsiders about the hazards of the situations which they were 
dealing with (Turner, 1976;  Gherardi et al., 1999).  An example of this statement was Toyota’s denial 
of all culpability in the 2010 accelerator issues which resulted in several fatalities.  Despite 
professional and technical warnings and advice, Toyota only ceded partial accountability once a 
tribunal pointed out that they had ignored prior expert warnings about the accelerators 
malfunctioning  (Gold, 2010;  Wright, 2010). 
Patterns of responsibility and awareness of statutory obligations and communications between top 
management, middle management and operational resources are often lacking (Turner, 1976).  The 
ability to consolidate the information at hand and make the danger visible, is hampered within a 
complex set of organisational responsibilities and communications.  This failure in creative problem- 
solving is compounded by a passive administrative stance adopted by parties involved, who receive 
the information necessary to avert the disaster but who fail for a number of reasons to consider it 
actively.  Additional factors exacerbating the failure are the extent to which informal contacts 
between the community are developed at the expense of more formal procedures, and the extent to 
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which the need to implement mitigating actions are done, cutting corners because of other work 
pressures (Turner, 1971; Shaluf, 2007a, 2008). 
Wrong or misleading information may be shared between parties, which may originate from 
interpersonal difficulties, so that information is unintentionally distorted.  Even when information is 
available, it is not always utilised, either because recipients do not attend to it, or because they fail 
to see its significance (Nakamura & Kijima, 2008).   
Failures in the training department could potentially manifest in a myriad of precursors:  high 
workload, undue time pressure, inappropriate perception of hazards, ignorance of the system, and 
motivational difficulties (Reason, 1990). 
Another problem is the failure to see or to appreciate fully the magnitude of some emergent danger.  
When potential hazards are recognised, they are commonly underestimated; even when the danger 
is clearly visible, many individuals and groups still undervalue it (Turner, 1971). Ambiguity and 
disagreement among parties (‘strangers’) about the status and significance of the evidence pointing 
to possible danger further contributes to the undervaluing of evidence (Reason et al., 2001).  The 
Toyota accelerator problem (Gold, 2010;  Wright, 2010) is an example, where the technical 
resources had highlighted the defective mechanism, but the decision-makers felt that the probability 
of the accelerator malfunctioning was low enough to be ignored. 
When the full scale of developing danger becomes impossible to ignore, the straightforward act of 
strengthening precautions is seldom done; instead, individuals often begin to take action to shift the 
blame, while others seek to take control of the situation by wholly inappropriate means.  Managers 
should be uncompromising in their efforts to seek ‘to know what they don't know’, to devise reward 
and incentive systems to identify the cost of failures and the benefits of reliability, to communicate 
the big picture to everyone, and try to get everyone to communicate with each other about how 
they fit in the big picture (Roberts et al., 2001).  
2.5.3 Technological Factors 
In a review of Charles Perrow’ theory of Normal Accidents, which states that “catastrophic accidents 
with high-risk technology systems are inevitable over time if the systems are complex and tightly 
coupled”, Sagan (2004, p.17) notes that “no individual component, human or mechanical, is perfect.  
We know this, so we load our complex systems with safety devices in the form of buffers, 
redundancies, circuit breakers, alarms, bells, and whistles.  In complex and in tightly coupled 
systems, however, these redundant safety devices are not independent of one another: The alarm 
rattles the bell; the bell shatters the whistle; the whistle explodes; and suddenly the whole system 
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collapses”. The human reliability community is tasked with unearthing a method of identifying and 
neutralising these latent failures before they coalesce with local triggering events to breach the 
system's defences (Reason, 1990; Tetzlaff, 2001).  It is the loading of the systems with these 
redundant safety measures, e.g. alerting and monitoring software which creates or increases the 
complexity of the system which could produce hidden common-mode errors, and it is these hidden 
errors which Turner’s theory (1976) refers to as pathogens.  Technological problems which include 
defective equipment and faulty design play a part in the creation and amplification of crisis 
(Richardson, 1994). 
Disasters are expected to grow due to the increasing intricacies of human-made socio-technical 
systems in modern societies, because there is a bigger chance that a substantial flaw will be built 
into at least one part of the system.  Complex systems are ambiguous, to the extent that those who 
work in and with them are only partially aware of how the different parts of their system are 
interlinked (Chapman, 2005).    
The barriers to catastrophe which are carefully designed may contain vulnerabilities that no-one has 
thought of (Swuste, 2007), and these vulnerabilities are sometimes like “holes in slices of Swiss 
cheese” (Reason, 2000, p.769) (Figure 8). Just as one can sometimes see a hole all the way through 
even a thick block of Swiss cheese, the little problem gets through all the barriers and becomes a big 
problem.  
 
 
Figure 8. The Swiss cheese model of accident causation (Reason et al., 2001) 
 
What makes this alignment problem particularly difficult to avoid completely is that some holes or 
vulnerabilities are present all the time, while others may open and close depending on the 
circumstances.  When a problem cascade begins, the holes suddenly line up and a catastrophe 
occurs (Roberts et al., 2001).  The Swiss-cheese model can be used to explain how a process, which 
had been working for years, seemingly encounters so many issues.     
Companies are complex, tightly coupled systems (Reason et al., 2001). Their complexity derives from 
several factors, the most noteworthy of which is the existence of several defences, barriers, 
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safeguards, and administrative controls designed to protect potential victims from local hazards.  
Within systems which are well safeguarded, disasters have a low chance of happening, and thus 
need help from chance to produce a disaster (Reason, 1990). The more complex the system, the 
greater the likelihood that defensive gaps and weaknesses will align to create a disaster (Reason et 
al., 2001). 
 
Companies use redundancy or backup procedures to defend themselves against malfunctions 
(Keeton et al., 2004).  However, these redundant defences may result in a deceptive appreciation of 
security and an over-confidence in the integrity of the mechanical system.  A result of this 
phenomenon is that companies may ignore the warning signs and alarms, because people associate 
them with testing or malfunction rather than with genuine emergencies (Chapman, 2005). 
 
Over-confidence has been connected to organisational and group culture in situations where 
prevailing beliefs, attitudes and norms decrease awareness and responsiveness to risk factors 
(Chapman, 2005).   South Africa is historically not prone to severe natural disasters such as 
earthquakes, etc., and the Western Cape particularly is not prone to flooding on the scale at which it 
has affected companies in other parts of the country.  Therefore, one of the subsidiary companies of 
Company X, has opted to have both primary and secondary (backup) systems in adjacent data 
centres in the same building.   This is a huge risk, even though the probability of a natural disaster is 
low.  The executive board of this company has acknowledged and accepted this risk.  The absence of 
huge natural disasters in South Africa has made them less responsive to risk. 
In most organised systems, especially technologically complex ones, everything is intertwined; the 
tighter the intertwining, the more susceptible the system is to disaster if anything goes wrong in any 
part of the system (Roberts et al., 2001). The propensity for disasters can be viewed as normal 
because the interdependencies in a system are so great that a small glitch in one place can lead to a 
large failure somewhere else (Roberts et al.). Root causes of catastrophes are inadvertently 
embedded in operational systems, latent until an undesirable combination of events occurs.  This 
means that small problems can cascade into disasters if they are not stopped by pre-planned 
organisational, technical, or procedural defences (Swuste, 2007;  Reason, 1990).   These pre-planned 
processes and defences are contained in the holistic management of IT Continuity. 
2.6 Disaster Management 
Some strategies for disaster management are presented. Shaluf (2008) defines disaster management 
as a collective term encompassing all aspects of planning for and response to disasters, including 
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pre-disaster and post-disaster activities.  It may refer to the management of the risks and 
consequences of disasters.  Nelson (2000) reinforces this notion, and defines IT Disaster 
Management as the process of examining the possibilities of losing an IT system and formulating the 
procedures and strategies to minimise the damage. As elaborated on by Holmes (2010), the 
definitions encompass several fundamental concepts which are key to the management of disasters, 
namely: (a) threats, i.e. the identification and reduction of risk; (b) impacts, i.e. the understanding of 
the consequences of an occurrence; (c) resilience, i.e. the reduction of vulnerabilities to enable the 
company to survive; (d) response, i.e. the examination of the how of recovery; (e) effective, i.e. 
whether the recovery solution can be tested; and (f) interests, i.e. the protection of all stakeholder 
interests. 
Mitigation is the collective activity which prevents a disaster, reduces the probability of a disaster 
happening, or lessens the damaging effects of unavoidable disaster.  Preparedness relates to the 
planning which needs to be done to respond to a disaster.  Planning includes the DR exercises and 
training in which all stakeholders involved in IT Continuity must participate.  People need to 
understand their respective roles, and testing is vital to ensure that the DR plan is realistic and 
workable.  Response enkindles the actions before, during and after a disaster, in order to minimise 
the impact of the disaster, and is accomplished through the actions taken in response to warnings.  
Recovery pertains to the immediate and long-term activities undertaken to return organisations to a 
pre-disaster state or improved state (Shaluf et al., 2003a, 2003b; Shaluf, 2007a, 2008).  Mitgation, 
preparedness, planning, response and recovery can be mapped back to the Ibrahim-Razi Model in 
Figure 5, i.e. they are the control measures required to manage the steps to prevent a disaster, or to 
enable efficient recovery from a disaster.  Insight Consulting (2008) offered six key principles that 
enable the management of risk to ensure the continuity of technology and data (Table 1).   
 
Table 1. Six Key Principles of IT Continuity and Definitions (Insight Consulting, 2008) 
Principle Definition
Protect Protecting the ITC environment is critical to maintaining the desired levels of availability for an organisation. The 
services are at threat from environmental failures, hardware failures, operational errors, and malicious attack.
Detect Detecting incidents at the earliest opportunity will minimise the impact to services, reduce the recovery effort, and 
preserve the quality of service.
React Reacting to an incident in the most appropriate manner will enable an efficient recovery and keep any downtime to a 
minimum. Reacting poorly may result in a minor incident escalating into something more serious.
Recover Recovery of services should be performed in a controlled and predetermined fashion. Identifying and implementing the 
appropriate recovery strategy will ensure the timely resumption of services and maintain the quality of data.
Resume Understanding the recovery priorities as well as the recovery point and recovery time objectives allows the most critical 
services to be reinstated first. Services of a less critical nature may be reinstated at a later time or in some 
circumstances not at all.
Return The process of returning from disaster mode to normal operations is often neglected by organisations. All IT Continuity 
plans should have an exit strategy that allows them to vacate their ITC disaster recovery centre when the time comes.
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According to Insight Consulting (2008), the six principles of Protect, Detect, React, Recover, Resume 
and Return concisely consolidate the entire disaster management cycle phenomenon without 
introducing redundancy or repetition, or losing any of the important factors.  ‘Protect’ is related to 
the activities, processes and plans to defend against threats, e.g. backups, so that a secondary copy 
of the data is always available.  ‘Detect’ relates to the tools and processes put in place to uncover 
vulnerabilities, e.g. monitoring and alert tools used to detect capacity deficiencies such as running 
out of memory or storage.  ‘React’ refers to the plans put in place to respond and counter the 
impacts of a disaster, e.g. the pre-defined procedure the operator has to communicate alerts to the 
relevant parties to fix, and if they do not, the procedures to escalate the issues. ‘Recover’ relates to 
activities which must be performed in a controlled and pre-determined fashion to bring the business 
processes and systems back to a point of operation.  ‘Resume’ enkindles the activities, plans and 
documentation used to re-commence business operations, e.g. should the DR environment run out 
of storage, assess the growth, understand why it was over-subscribed, and put in the necessary 
mitigations to ensure that storage caters for long-term growth. ‘Return’ is the process of going back 
to normal operations and to returning to the facilities which were damaged during the disaster. 
Irrespective of which Disaster Management strategy is followed in companies, they all have the 
benefit of showing, in an ordered and structured manner, where shortcomings in the disaster 
management Disciplines are, and which can be addressed with appropriate actions. 
2.7 IT Continuity Management Model 
ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) and CobiT (Control Objectives for Information 
and Related Technology) are among the many international standards which explain desirable 
functions of the IT Continuity unit (Ridley et al., 2004; Saint-Germain, 2005).  ITIL for instance, 
propagates continuous service as the control over IT processes, with the business objective of 
making sure that IT services are available as needed, and to ensure minimum business impact in the 
event of a major disruption.  It further holds that continuous service is facilitated by putting into 
practice an operational and tested IT Continuity Plan which is aligned with the complete Business 
Continuity Plan and the associated business requirements (Heschl, 2006).   
IT Continuity operates within a framework encompassing various components such as governance 
and legal aspects which guide and determine the realm in which it operates (Heschl, 2006).  To this 
end, there are several best practice guidelines promulgated for Continuity Management, e.g.  
(a) BS 25999, the British Standard for Business Continuity, which was launched in 2007 and 
provides a basis for understanding, developing and implementing IT continuity within an 
organization (Woodman & Kumar, 2009);  
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(b) The King II/III reports which recommend good corporate governance practices which 
companies should pursue for the purposes of continuity; 
(c) ISO/IEC 27031, an ICT-focused standard on business continuity (Hill & Haslag, 2010; Holmes, 
2010). 
 
Effective IT governance practices can be achieved through the application of recognised frameworks, 
methodologies, continuous assessments and monitoring (Kana et al., 2009).  The Hill & Haslag Model 
(Hill & Haslag, 2010) has been selected to illustrate some key functions of IT Continuity Management 
(Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. IT Continuity Management Model as proposed by Hill & Haslag, 2010. 
 
Business Process Analysis (BPA) identifies the critical business functions of the organisation, and 
seeks to underscore those functions which serve as the life-blood of the company.  It must be 
emphasised that IT Continuity Management can only be effective when it is business-driven, i.e. the 
Recovery Times Objectives (RTO) and the Recovery Point Objectives (RPO) must be driven by 
business recovery requirements and not by IT capabilities (Toigi, 2003).  IT capabilities should evolve 
to achieve business recovery requirements (Botha & Von Solms, 2003).  The Business Impact Analysis 
(BIA) identifies the impact a disruption may have on a business, and defines the allowable outage 
times. It further serves to characterise the impact on critical roles if vital resources are unavailable, 
and identifies the maximum acceptable period that the resource could be unavailable before 
unacceptable impacts result (Gregory, 2008).  It aids the prevention of losses by issuing warning to 
business and individuals.  The BIA would typically bring to light those critical IT systems or operations 
which recovery capabilities are insufficient, i.e. do not meet the RTO and RPO of the business.  The 
BIA is valuable, as it uses objective measures to prioritise systems and operations by how urgently 
they need improved recovery capabilities, which provides a focus for applying limited resources such 
as personnel and funding (Hiles, 2011). 
The Risk Analysis or Assessment (RA) provides protection to the critical business functions identified, 
and evaluates the threats which serve as risks to those functions, i.e. it identifies the assets, threats, 
vulnerabilities and counter-measures for each IT service (Helms et al., 2006). It further serves as a 
plan to implement mitigation strategies to contain the risks.  The management of hardware 
(servers), network, and applications must be done with the appropriate level of diligence. The 
response to customer requests must be accomplished within acceptable time-lines. Data must 
always be backed up, and Service Level Agreement (SLA) must be negotiated within the company 
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among the various business departments.  The maximum acceptable level of downtime must be 
agreed.  An important component is setting the standard for critical services, non-critical services 
and ring-fenced services (which require additional attention), with the ultimate aim of protecting the 
business from the threat of data loss (Shields, 2009). 
Vital to the process is a cost assessment, which should encompass not only the financial aspect of 
creating a viable continuity framework, but also include the non-financial aspects.  Legislation came 
into effect in South Africa in 2008 and 2009 which pertains particularly to IT continuity (Nielsen, 
2008). Executives, who make poor decisions regarding continuity practices which lead to disaster, 
will be seen as negligent, and such negligence is a criminal offence (Nielsen, 2008). It is this kind of 
factor which must be taken into the cost assessment, e.g. having the CEO jailed and the impact it has 
on the share price of the company, brand, loss of customers, etc.   
The certification of solutions is not just about compliance, it is about demonstrating recovery 
readiness and accountability.  To re-commence business operations, organisations must have 
running IT systems, and the business data must be up-to-date and recovered.  All the factors of the 
IT Continuity Model must be taken into consideration, and planned to demonstrate readiness.  
These plans must be implemented and tested, and if the organisation cannot resume operation 
within a realistic time (as measured by the RTO and RPO) after a disaster, the continuity plans are 
inefficient (Best Computer Practices, 2009).  The certification process includes the knowledge of 
procedures, as well as the competence with the recovery software and hardware tools and 
Interfaces of IT human resources and testing staff (Vision Solutions, 2009). 
The ‘Develop Enterprise solutions’ function recognises that IT Continuity requires an in-depth 
understanding of the IT services offered in terms of: 1) how the technology works; 2) how the 
technology is configured; and 3) how the systems are used within the organisation. Without the 
knowledge of all three domains, a service may not be restored to provide the functionality that was 
once there (Kadlec & Shropshire, 2009). It is not operational unless it is usable and encompasses all 
aspects of recovery.   The ‘Evolve Solutions, Services and Strategies’ appreciates that recovery is a 
continuous process that needs to be maintained and ingrained into the organisation.  
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2.8 Conceptual Model 
Examining how technological disasters are formed, the Turner Model (Figure 3) and the Ibrahim-Razi 
Model (Figure 5), highlighted areas where disasters may be averted if the necessary actions are 
taken to mitigate the exposure.  In the Turner Model it is found in the precipitating event, and in the 
Ibrahim-Razi Model it is in the warnings and corrections phases (Phases 3 and 5, respectively). The 
Human, Organisational and Technological factors at play often hinder corrective actions, to the 
extent that they allow errors to accumulate.  These become repetitive patterns which serve as 
warnings which, if not corrected, align to create a disaster.   
A Conceptual Model (Figure 10) which consolidates concepts discussed in the literature review, such 
as the causes of disasters, the HOT factors, and the disaster mitigation strategies, has been 
developed, and forms the basis for the research of this study. 
 
Figure 10. Conceptual Model of the Research (compiled from the Literature Review, Figures 3, 5, 6, and 9) 
The Conceptual Model recognises the incubation period (Stage 2 of the Turner Model in Figure 3, 
and Stages 2-4 of the Ibrahim-Razi Model in Figure5 as the key element which needs to be managed. 
It is in this phase where unmanaged elements accumulate to trigger disasters.   This is the phase 
where vital warning signs can be misread, evidence can be disregarded or misinterpreted, and where 
organisations fall into the incompetence trap and learn to do the wrong thing better. This period is 
characterised by sufficient time for all the minor events to interact and accumulate to produce major 
system failure (Shaluf et al., 2002b, 2003b; Shaluf, 2008).   
An IT disaster is an event, or chain of events, resulting in the inability of an organisation to provide IT 
services.  Disasters often start in a small way with seemingly insignificant operational mishaps and 
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managerial decisions. There is then an incubation period, and eventually problems accumulate until 
the organisation’s view of itself, and how it manages its risks, grows increasingly at odds with the 
real state of affairs.  Ultimately this mismatch explodes in the form of a disaster. The recurring 
problems serve as the warning signs, as proposed by the Ibrahim-Razi Model.  If these problems 
remain uncorrected and unmitigated, one trigger event is the catalyst which will plunge the 
organisation into disaster.  These recurring problems are caused by human, organisational and 
technological factors (HOT factors). 
As far as IT disasters are concerned, the mitigation strategies reside in resilience engineering. 
Resilience is an IT system’s ability to effectively adjust to hazardous influences, rather than resist or 
deflect them. Failure relates to the inability of the system to adapt to and absorb variations, 
changes, disturbances, disruptions and surprises.  The following essential functions of IT continuity 
management are required to be effective:  
a) business process analysis which identifies the critical business functions of the organisation; 
b) business impact analysis which identifies the potential harm caused by threats to, and 
vulnerabilities of, the organisation; 
c) performing a risk assessment or analysis for each of the IT services in order to identify the 
assets, threats, vulnerabilities and counter-measures for each service; 
d) planning mitigation strategies and assessing costs; 
e) certifying solutions which are not based on compliance, but rather on demonstrating 
recovery readiness and accountability; 
f) developing enterprise-wide solutions which cannot become operational unless they are used 
and entail all aspects of recovery; and 
g) evolving solutions, services and strategies. 
Once these IT continuity management processes are in place, the company is then required to build 
the environment, first by designing the solution, certifying it, and implementing it in accordance with 
the information yielded by the above mentioned processes.  The process is an iterative one, i.e. once 
HOT factors/issues which service recurring issues are identified, the necessary action, processes and 
plans need to be implemented in the disaster management life-cycle.   
IT Continuity Management can be effective only when it is business-driven. Recovery times and 
recovery points must be driven by business recovery requirements, not by IT capabilities. IT 
capabilities should evolve to achieve business recovery requirements. Therefore, recovery is a 
continuous process that needs to be maintained and entrenched in the organisation. 
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3. Research Questions 
This study seeks to understand the recurring issues within Company X that impede effective IT 
Continuity Management, what causes them, and how they can be mitigated.  The conceptual model 
(Figure 10) suggests that HOT factors cause warnings or symptoms which, if ignored or mismanaged, 
lead to a set of recurring issues.  The objective, then, is to establish if HOT factors are indeed the 
cause of recurring issues.  The research question can thus be postulated as follows: 
 What are the recurring issues that impede effective IT continuity management at Company X, 
and what factors cause them? 
The research further seeks to understand what Company X can do to deal with the flaws and 
limitations that have been exposed during IT Continuity testing and how the organisation can 
prepare for disasters.  The research question can thus be postulated as follows: 
 How can these recurring issues be mitigated? 
3.1 Propositions 
The propositions set out below are to test the validity of Human, Organisational and Technological 
factors in terms of their contribution to recurring issues experienced in IT Continuity within 
Company X. The HOT factors interact with each other and influence the justification and success of IT 
Continuity efforts in Company X. The company name has been withheld due to privacy issues. A 
representation of the link between research propositions to the literature on HOT issues may be 
found in Appendix B.  
3.1.1 Human Factor Propositions 
Human error is defined as the inappropriate or undesirable human decision or behaviour that has 
the potential for increasing disasters (Turner, 1976; Choo, 2005; Dekker et al., 2008; Werlinger et al., 
2009).  It is comprised of, but not limited to, employee morale, the number of people staffing each 
unit, the quality of training, and the manager’s experience.  The human factor propositions relate to 
the recurring experiences within the company and are illustrated below. 
Proposition 3.1.1.1: Credibility 
The concept of credibility is borrowed from the open source community, where product gurus and 
large corporates lend credibility to open source products to the extent that companies adopt them 
(Glass, 2004; Ven & Verelst, 2006).  The concept of credibility was used in this study to test if senior 
management professing a strong business continuity ethos lend credibility to the IT Continuity unit 
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in Company X, i.e. is apathy attributed to a lack of management support?  The proposition can thus 
be postulated as follows: 
 Where there is an observed credibility bestowed on IT Continuity via the support of senior 
management, it increases the propensity in lower management to adopt an interest in IT 
Continuity efforts. 
Proposition 3.1.1.2: Terms of Reference 
Apathy regarding IT Continuity is a recurring problem in Company X and, according to Shaw et al. 
(2004), not until a disaster happens and severe losses are experienced do people realise the need for 
disaster preparedness.  The study tested whether the mental paradigms of people are only attuned 
to disaster preparedness if they have previously been affected by a disaster; and conversely, that the 
lack of previous exposure to disaster events results in an inadequate allocation of time and 
resources and incomplete/ineffective continuity plans. 
 The lack of previous exposure to disaster events puts the concept far out of reach of people’s 
understanding and terms of reference, and this negatively influences the attitude and effort 
toward IT Continuity. 
3.1.2 Organisational Factor Propositions 
Organisational inadequacies are comprised of policy failures, insufficient resources allocations, 
strategic business pressure leading to a neglect of safety issues, communication breakdowns etc. 
The organisational factor propositions relate to the recurring experiences within the company and 
are illustrated below. 
Proposition 3.1.2.1:  Available Resources 
Available resources (also known as slack) comprise two factors: human, i.e. the resources have the 
time available (slack time), and financial, i.e. the budget has additional capacity to explore, invest in, 
and adopt technologies (Zhu et al., 2003; Dedrick et al., 2004).  Slack relates to the Business Analysis, 
Business Impact Analysis, Cost Assessment and Risk Assessment phase of the IT Continuity 
Management Model (Figure 9).  The study explores the concept of slack, which has traditionally 
been used in the technology innovation, to understand how slack correlates with IT Continuity. Since 
available resources, e.g. resources do not have the time to dedicate to IT Continuity efforts, is a 
recurring feature in Company X, the thinking behind this concept is to understand if proper IT 
Continuity Management, as depicted in the Conceptual Model (Figure 10), is dependent on slack in 
the organisation to ensure that resources are available to commit to the necessary work effort 
required.  The proposition can thus be postulated as follows: 
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 The greater the degree of available slack, the greater the propensity of a coherent IT Continuity 
effort in the company.   
Proposition 3.1.2.2: Legislation and Standards 
Legislation imposes mandatory adherence to, and implementation of, IT Continuity.  It is prescriptive 
in imposing mandatory adherence, but offers no guidance on implementation.   While the literature 
is rich in providing statistical sources regarding the lack of interest in IT Continuity displayed by 
companies, it is scarce in supplying the underlying reasons behind the lack of interest displayed.  
Reinforcing this problem statement is the fact that, because we have no view as to why this problem 
exists, we thus cannot treat or rectify it.  Hence we are left to speculate at the apparent reasons, be 
they lack of government involvement and not promulgating the appropriate laws, lack of industry 
standards and best practice guidance (or the extremely high number of standards and best 
practices), or whether people in the IT industry are simply ignoring them (Honour, 2007).  The study 
examined whether the lack of implementation guidance by the various IT Continuity standards 
negatively influences the stance Company X takes in adopting, implementing and enforcing IT 
Continuity practices, and is postulated as follows: 
 The many available best practices in IT Continuity, e.g. ITIL, CoBIT, ISO, BS99100, obscure 
companies and negatively impact on the propensity to enforce IT Continuity standards properly. 
Proposition 3.1.2.3: Cost Justification 
IT Continuity faces many obstacles, the most prominent being that, similar to life insurance, IT 
Continuity is a “grudge” insurance (Regensberg, 2008, p.8; Vision Solutions, 2009).  It is very difficult 
to prove a Return on Investment (ROI) because IT Continuity is viewed as a budget overhead, 
protecting against something that may never happen and not contributing directly to ‘the bottom-
line’.  Of the values that IT Continuity delivers, ROI is the most tenuous and difficult to quantify, and 
the insurance benefit of a continuity investment is earned only if a disaster occurs (Schopp et al., 
2006).   
 The difficultly in justifying the costs of IT Continuity or proving Return on Investment negatively 
impacts on IT Continuity’s ability to secure funding for investments in information availability. 
3.1.3 Technological Factor Propositions 
Technological factors enkindle the processes which are necessary to ensure that the design, build, 
implementation and testing of technology match the original intent and intended use.  Since the 
majority of recurring problems emerge during testing (when the greatest focus is placed on IT 
Continuity efforts in the company), the technological factor propositions explored are an 
impediment to IT Continuity efforts. 
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Proposition 3.1.3.1: Compatibility and Complexity 
Compatibility and complexity speak to the ‘Develop Enterprise solutions’ in the IT Continuity 
Management Model (Figure 9). End of Life (EOL) Technology, i.e. technology which has reached its 
full depreciation cycle in production, e.g. 4 years for a server, is used in the Remote Data Centre 
(RDC), and therefore the infrastructure is old.  In addition, the capacity in the RDC is about 80% of 
that in production.  Thus testing is not always on like-for-like technology (servers of a later 
generation in production).  This introduces a level of complexity.  The study determined whether 
compatibility and complexity influenced the propensity of resources to embrace IT Continuity 
efforts, i.e. were these factors inhibitors to the processes and competencies necessary for the 
effective management of IT Continuity?  The relationship is stated below: 
 The greater the Compatibility with existing technologies, skills and tasks, the greater the 
propensity to adopt IT Continuity measures.  Where the technology is considered an appropriate 
fit for the task, it influences the decision to adopt positively.  
Proposition 3.1.3.2: Trialability/Testability 
As stated in the IT Continuity Management Model (Figure 9), the ‘Evolve Solutions, services and 
strategies’ phase appreciates that recovery is a continuous process that needs to be maintained.  
Trialability (also known as testability) is the demonstration of recovery readiness and accountability 
(‘Certify Solutions’ phase in the IT Continuity Management Model (Figure 9)).  The study undertook 
to understand whether trialability enables Company X to learn and understand the functionality of 
the hardware and software, thereby removing a significant amount of risk from the software 
development lifecycle process, consequently allowing for a deeper understanding of both the 
software and the requirements (Guliani & Woods, 2005).  The Remote Data Centre (RDC) IT 
Continuity tests are conducted bi-annually and, because the Mainframe in the Remote Data Centre 
is unavailable outside of these slots, testing between the RDC tests is not possible.  This study would 
like to further examine the correlation between the ability to test and the attitude toward IT 
Continuity.   
 IT Continuity is more likely to be adopted if technologies can be tried and assimilated in small 
portions over time.   
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4. Overview of the company 
Company X is one of South Africa’s leading financial services groups.  The company has its main 
operations at a central campus where two adjacent data centres, providing fail-over for each other, 
are housed in the same building. It has a remote data centre facility in Midrand. The company has 
about 6000 resources and annual revenue in excess of R100m.  Its vision is to be the leader in wealth 
creation and protection in South Africa, leading that process in the emerging markets and playing a 
niche role in the developed markets. Table 3 portrays key metrics of Company X. 
Company X has a strong Business Continuity ethos, having an established Business Continuity 
Advisory Board (BCAB).  The Board prescribes minimum standards and requirements for IT 
Continuity to ensure effective vertical and horizontal disaster recovery abilities, consistent with 
business priorities, to deal with disasters and related contingencies.  The Board meets quarterly, to 
monitor adherence to IT Continuity efforts, to confirm the adherence to Group Business Continuity 
standards, to provide a framework for the company to support compliance with Group 
requirements, and to establish company-specific processes and requirements where necessary. 
Until 2009, Company X used Service Provider A as a third party vendor for their disaster recovery 
solution.  In January 2010 Service Provider B took over the Disaster Recovery (DR) services.  Both 
third parties (Service Providers A and B) evaluate their disaster recovery readiness by assessing their 
ability to keep the mainframe environment running.  The disaster recovery site is a ‘warm site’, the 
definition of which is that which “provides an environment and basic infrastructure to enable the 
facility to be reinstated before its absence becomes critical for business survival.  It may have most 
of the equipment required for normal operations except for items that can be supplied quickly from 
stock” (Hiles, 2011, p.376).  A warm site “has systems and communications ready to go, but it 
requires that data be restored before they are ready to be used” (Wallace & Webber, 2011, p.321). 
The study was undertaken during the transition phase between Service Providers A and B, where 
Service Provider A hosted the infrastructure and Service Provider B provided the DR services. 
Because this model was based on availability of hardware and not the criticality of applications, 
disaster recovery readiness appeared deceptively high.  In addition to two Remote Data Centre tests 
performed per annum, Company X also performs two High Availability tests per year to ascertain its 
Disaster Recovery readiness.   
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4.1 Overview of the Remote Data Centre (RDC) Test 
The main objective of each Remote Data Centre (RDC) Test is to establish current and up-to-date 
company IT Continuity capability. To accommodate this, bi-annual tests are contracted with the IT  
Service Providers for the offsite site recovery exercise.  
The Remote Data Centre (RDC) test is a fully integrated test covering all critical applications hosted 
in the remote data centre in Midrand.  The test involves IT development resources, service providers 
and business users.  Testing is conducted from the Disaster Recovery (DR) laboratory at the Head 
Office of Company X. The DR laboratory is on an isolated wide area network with 6 megabyte 
connectivity to the Remote Data Centre in Midrand.  It is furnished with sixteen desktop PCs, from 
which all testing is conducted. In preparation for the DR test, the desktops must be built to 
accommodate all the user profiles of the various IT and business department resources, 
incorporating all the software required by these respective parties.  
4.1.1 Test Process 
Extensive preparation is undertaken for the RDC Test.  The current DR test approach is depicted in 
Figure 11.  The Recovery Point Objective (RPO) Service Level Agreement (SLA) is no more than a 
four-day data loss.  Backups to tape are taken twice every a week, on a Wednesday and on a Sunday, 
ensuring that there will never be a data lag greater than 4 days.   The backups are transported to the 
remote data centre in Midrand on the following day, and the restore of these backup tapes 
commences on arrival.   
 
Figure 11.  The current DR solution in place taken from Company X internal documentation. 
 
At the start of the RDC test, Service Provider A, supporting the RDC facility, brings the mainframe 
and open systems environment online and prepares the RDC for the test.  Once the mainframe is 
brought online, the database agents restore the Microsoft SQL, UDB and DB2 databases and 
complete the database restores approximately 18 hours later.  Service Provider B then performs 
health checks of the RDC environment before handing the remote data centre over to the ITC 
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Coordinator for Company X, who in turn calls in various IT resources to perform their IT Operational 
Readiness testing.  All tests are performed from a dedicated DR laboratory on the main campus of 
Company X.  All sixteen computers in this laboratory are on an isolated wide area network (WAN) 
and connected to the RDC.   
Once the IT teams have signed off their respective environments, the business representatives are 
called in to perform business testing. For the purposes of the RDC test, business is instructed to 
prepare all their test cases against the last restore.  Business testing runs for a full week from 
Monday to Friday afternoon at 4pm.  A full batch process is performed post business online testing 
to test the transactions performed during business testing and these results are verified by the 
business the following Monday morning.  Once all business areas have signed off, the ITC 
coordinator for Company X hands control of the RDC environment back to Service Provider B.  Full 
backups are taken of the production environment on Sunday evening, and these are transported to 
the remote data centre on Monday.  Once the tapes arrive at the remote data centre, the restore 
starts.  This restore is specifically designed to test the Recovery Time Objective (RTO), as the SLA in 
place currently stipulates a 24 hour recovery in the event of a disaster. 
The results of the tests are published in a report released daily during the RDC test, and a summary 
report of all the critical applications tested during the test is released at the end of each respective 
RDC test.  A sample of the report can be viewed in Table 2.  Each application is marked with an RAG 
indicator (Red: not successful, Amber: partially successful, Green: successful) for 24 hour readiness, 
i.e. the SLA (Service Level Agreement) with the business that, in the event of a disaster, the 
application will be ready in 24 hours; and for business readiness, i.e. the RDC test spans 10 days and 
once the application is brought on line and tested by the respective IT teams it is ready to be handed 
over to the business testers for testing to ensure data integrity against production data.   
Nr Application RAG for 
24 Hour 
Readiness 
RAG for 
Business 
Readiness  
Log 
Number 
Issue Short Term Resolution Long Term Resolution 
1a Application X  
 
 2228863 
 
Issues with 
Workflow 
with Case 
-SQL DB of workflow  
resolved 
-Can sign-on and work 
but cannot view images 
(related to the Content 
Manager DB which is 
being restored) 
-Tested successfully 
CAUSE:Application XYZ 
Queue Definitions on 
the Mainframe DR site 
incorrect 
 
Mitigation: Add a job to 
Production Scheduling 
that will run a job every 
night to backup these 
definitions 
Table 2. Sample of one of the application areas represented in the daily/summary report (Company X, Internal 
documentation). 
The issues encountered are listed on a high level, and the short and long term resolutions are noted 
with input from the IT Development teams.  The report is signed off by the respective application 
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area managers to confirm the integrity of the report and to take responsibility for the corrective 
actions which stem from the report.   
4.2 Overview of the High Availability (HA) Test 
Company X has two data centres adjacent to each other, in one building.  The focus of the HA test is 
on the fail-over capabilities of the critical applications (open systems) deployed in a high availability 
cluster.  The primary nodes of all these applications are deliberately shut down to force the 
secondary nodes to take control as primary nodes, irrespective of whether the primary node is 
resident in Data Centre 1 or Data Centre 2.  The HA test includes environments that are not 
clustered and are configured on Virtual Machines.  In addition, all components which support the 
critical applications must also be tested, e.g. network, telephony, etc. This recovery exercise is a 
functional test only, and no stress testing or load testing is included. The metric for determining the 
success of this exercise is whether there is a 100% recovery success rate of the different production 
services, of interconnectivity, and of recovery time. 
Testing for HA purposes is conducted on site from the IT and business users’ workstations.  HA tests 
are conducted on a Sunday to avoid minimum interruption to the production availability of systems. 
The HA test is run in controlled and predetermined fashion within stringent time-lines (as there is 
only one day in which to fail the systems to the secondary data centre and test on both IT and 
business levels; and fail-back to the primary data centre and test on both IT and business levels to 
ensure that the production landscape is ready for business on Monday).  
4.3 Overview of RDC and HA testing management 
For the duration of each test (both RDC and HA), a dedicated helpdesk resource captures all 
incidents, issues and problems in a problem-management tool.  Each issue is logged against a 
particularly category, be it a server issue, a database issue, etc.  Reporting is done at the end of each 
day for the duration of the test.  At the end of the test a summary report is generated in which all 
the issues experienced during the test period are recorded.  A post-mortem is held after each test, 
the results of which are included in the research, and this includes the participants’ comments 
and/or suggestions for improvement.  The IT continuity test results may change over time from test 
to test, and may therefore yield different results.   
4.4 RDC and HA test preparations 
Planning for a remote data centre or high availability test starts approximately five months prior to 
the test.  Meetings are held with the architects, service line managers and service providers to 
determine the scope of the tests. These interactions yield a scope document, which is presented to 
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the heads of the respective service lines, e.g. head of data centre, head of telecommunications 
(including network services), head of security, head of architecture and planning, and head of 
operations. These service line heads are collectively known as Manco.  Manco vets the scope 
document and confirms the feasibility of the proposed test.   
Once the scope document is signed-off, it is distributed to the IT Executives, Portfolio Heads and IT 
Application Owners.  Further detailed planning and amendments are done to the scope document 
during several iterations of meetings.   Actions in preparation of the tests are confirmed, e.g. 
confirming backup and restore instructions, and issues stemming from previous tests are highlighted 
to ensure ownership has been assigned and issues are able to be mitigated.  IT Application owners 
have the responsibility of informing their respective teams (IT Development) of the test, contracting 
the resources that participate in the test, and ensuring responsibility for the actions in preparation 
of the test.   
The IT Executives are the custodians of all the applications, i.e. they ensure that the applications 
defined by business as being critical are covered in the scope of the test and, where the applications 
are out of scope or failed in a previous test, etc., ensure that these are either raised on a risk register 
or that the relevant pressure is applied to IT Development to ensure that the application is included 
in the test. The service providers who supply the services ensure that the respective environments 
are ready for the test, e.g. that the data centre is ready, the network is available, and the desktops 
are built and ready.  A month prior to the test, the confirmed scope (including all the applications 
which are included and excluded from scope) and the issues are distributed to the Business 
Continuity Board, Chief Information Officers of the various companies, and all the above-mentioned 
parties.  This is the final stage in preparation for the tests.  All issues at this stage should have 
defined mitigating actions or corrective actions against them.   
On the business side, the project manager liaises with the Business Disaster Recovery Coordinators 
(BDRs), who contract time and availability with the business testers and ensure that the test cases 
are prepared.  Once the tests are performed and conducted, reports are produced with RAG (Red, 
Amber, Green) indicators as to how each application has performed during the test.  Once a year, 
following a test, the IT auditors audit IT Continuity and review the test processes. Each audit 
culminates in a findings list (or log), which must be mitigated before the next test.   
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5. Research Paradigm and Methodology 
5.1 Research Paradigm 
5.1.1 Strategy 
The Case Study research method was chosen because it has seen extensive application in 
Information Systems (IS), and because the approach seeks to understand the problem of recurring 
issues within IT Continuity being investigated (Gable, 1994).  Case Study strategy provided the 
opportunity to ask penetrating questions and to capture the richness of the organisational 
behaviour. Case Study was used to explore causation of recurring issues within IT Continuity in 
Company X. The method provided a systematic approach to looking at events, collecting data, 
analysing information, and reporting findings, and its results aided the researcher in gaining a 
refined insight into why the recurring issues were being experienced test after test. 
 
Case study was deemed the most appropriate method because it is concerned with how and why 
things happen, which allowed the investigation of contextual realities as well as the differences 
between what was planned and what actually occurred, namely:  
(1) the study of information systems in their natural setting.  Thus the resources could be 
observed in the laboratory during the RDC test, on the existing infrastructure.  
(2) The method allowed an opportunity to understand the nature and complexity of the process 
taking place; and  
(3) valuable insights could be gained into new topics emerging in the rapidly changing 
information systems field. 
Case Study also allowed examination of the flexibility to retain the holistic characteristics of real life 
events within the Company X while investigating empirical events.  Furthermore, Case Study as a 
research strategy attempts to examine: (a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, 
especially when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. As an 
experiment, it deliberately divorces the phenomenon from its context (Yin, 1981).  Case Study 
attempts to explain a phenomenon. 
The use of Case Study in Company X was not proposed as a study of the entire organisation.   It was 
intended to focus on particular issues and features within the sphere of IT Continuity. This method 
enabled the researcher to understand the complex real-life activities in which multiple sources of 
evidence were used. Case Study is particularly useful when one needs to understand some particular 
problem or situation in great-depth, and where one can identify cases rich in information (Baharein 
& Noor, 2008).   
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Qualitative research implies an emphasis on processes and meanings that are not rigorously 
examined, measured (if measured at all) in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency.   
Hence there are occasions, particularly in the social sciences, where researchers are interested in 
insight, discovery and interpretation rather than hypothesis testing (Saunders et al, 2003). The value 
in undertaking qualitative research in this context is because relatively little is known about what a 
given piece of observed behavior means, e.g. apathy to IT Continuity, until Company X has 
developed a description of the context in which the behaviour takes place, and has attempted to see 
the behaviour from the perspective of its originator. Such contextual understanding and empathetic 
objectives are unlikely to be achieved without direct, first-hand, more or less intimate knowledge of 
the research setting.  
The study is cognizant of weaknesses with qualitative research, namely: (1) the inability to 
manipulate independent variables, (2) the risk of improper interpretation, and (3) the lack of power 
to randomise.  In addition, four corresponding problems with Case Study research add to the 
criticism: (1) a lack of Controllability, Deductibility, Repeatability and Generalisability (Gable, 1994; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
To counter the above criticisms and to establish rigour, the research was systematic, and employed 
self-conscious research design, data collection, interpretation, and communication. To this end, the 
researcher sought to achieve two goals: to create an account of method and data which would stand 
independently so that another trained researcher could analyse the same data in the same way and 
come to essentially the same conclusions; and to produce a plausible and coherent explanation of 
the phenomenon under scrutiny (Mays & Pope, 1995).   
Case Study also supports the use of multiple types of evidence, namely by using a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative evidence. Blending qualitative and quantitative findings could 
potentially produce useful insights; and there are advantages to mixed-methods research in that it 
conveys a sense of rigour. The evidence may come from fieldwork, archival records, verbal reports, 
observations, or any combination of these (Yin, 1981).   
5.1.2 Research Philosophy 
Positivism is defined as an approach to the creation of knowledge through research which 
emphasises the model of natural science: the scientist adopts the position of objective researcher, 
who collects facts about the social world and then builds up an explanation of social life by arranging 
those facts in a chain of causality (Baharein & Noor, 2008).  The philosophy applied was positivist 
because the research worked with an observable social reality (established by the various models 
engaged, and by the reality experienced in the IT Continuity unit studied) which could be measured 
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with the aim of producing law-like generalisations (laws of cause and effect).  Mere observable 
phenomena can yield reliable data, therefore the data collection strategy is aided by usage of 
existing theory to develop propositions and research questions. This can lead to further 
development of theory that can be tested by further research. The results were derived from 
detached interpretations of the data collected, and attempted to be value-free.  The models utilised 
lend the structured methodology required for replication, resulting in the qualitative observations 
and conclusions.  
The research was interpretive because it was also a quest to understand the fundamental meanings 
which underlie IT Continuity.  Trying to ascertain the attitudes of the sample population toward IT 
continuity would involve interpreting and transposing the results of their responses to a coded 
framework.  Interpretive research focuses on the knowledge of reality gained through social 
constructions, as well as on the complexity of human sense-making, and highlights that interpretive 
research does not pre-define dependent and independent variables.  
5.1.3 Research Approach 
The research approach was deductive because it used the scientific principles of established theory 
to generate data, i.e. the various models employed shaped the approach adopted to the qualitative 
research process and to aspects of data analysis.  The data gathered was explored and explained the 
casual relationships between variables, i.e. several models are utilised which offered several 
propositions and gave context against which a relationship measuring success or failure was derived.   
5.1.4 Research Purpose 
Explanatory research may be useful in studying processes in companies (Baharein & Noor, 2008). 
The research is explanatory because it sought to establish relationships between variables, i.e. by 
looking at the various models proposed, it determines how closely the organisation mirrored and 
adhered to the processes depicted by the models to achieve the goals of the research.   
The research is also exploratory in that it endeavoured to seek new insights into the attitudes 
toward IT continuity, with the aim of yielding results which could be implemented to change the 
unfavourable paradigms in which the discipline currently operates.  An explanatory Case Study 
comprises (a) an accurate rendition of the facts of the case, (b) some consideration of alternative 
explanations of these facts, and (c) a conclusion based on the single explanation that appears most 
congruent with the facts (Yin, 1981).   
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5.2 Research Methodology 
The research conducted comprised two activities: (1) an analysis of the results of previous RDC and 
HA tests to establish the extent of recurring ITC testing issues that had been observed in Company X, 
and (2) a survey to establish the reasons for the recurring issues that had been observed. 
5.2.1 Timeframe 
The research was longitudinal because it analysed the results of four Remote Data Centre tests 
(Disaster Recovery tests) and three HA (High Availability) tests, as depicted in Table 3: 
Remote Data Centre Test High Availability Test 
October 2009 November 2009 
May 2010 May 2010 
June 2010 October 2010 
November 2010  
Table 3. DR and HA Tests used for the research 
5.2.2 Survey Instruments 
The instruments to collect data were questionnaires and documentary analysis. The results of seven 
IT Continuity tests (four Remote Disaster Recovery tests and three High Availability tests), captured 
in the problem management tool, were extrapolated into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. These were 
analysed and yielded a list of recurring issues.   
The sources of data used in documentary analysis included scope documents, audit findings, IT 
Continuity board reports, minutes of meetings, and the IT Continuity policy.   The format in which 
these documents were presented was Microsoft word documents. 
The data was recorded in a standardised template to present data for different sample types in a 
single document.   The template contained the purpose of the source document, how it related to 
the research question and why it was important, and a list of key points covered by each document.  
The template also included a checklist of factors to ensure that the evidence collected from each 
sample was complete.  Each document type was categorised into components so as to ensure easy 
accessibility and reference, should the need arise for further clarification and for data capture.  The 
documentary analyses were captured into both Microsoft Word documents and Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets (using pivot tables to outline emerging themes).   
Documentary sources were important to complement and to compensate for the limitations of 
other methods.  Documentary evidence acted as a system to cross-validate the information gathered 
from the questionnaire, focus groups and for observation, given that sometimes what people say 
may be different from what people do. Additionally, the documents provided guidelines in assisting 
the researcher with the inquiry during discussions. Official and unofficial documents and records 
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pertaining to the process of testing activities in the organisation were analysed. Thus, corroboration 
of multiple qualitative techniques for this Case Study research enhance the validity and reliability of 
findings. 
Two qualitative methods were used, namely participant observation and focus groups. Each method 
used was suited to obtaining a specific type of data. Participants were observed during the Remote 
Data Centre tests in the DR Laboratory as well as during the on-site HA tests.  This method was 
appropriate for collecting data on naturally-occurring behaviours in their usual contexts, allowing 
the researcher to observe both IT and business users during the tests.  Initially, IT operational 
readiness testing is concluded with sign-off a test checklist to signal that systems have been brought 
up and that they are ready for hand over to business testing.  Business testing then commences and 
concludes with a sign-off sheet on which comments could be entered.   The researcher was able to 
take note of both verbal and written comments during the tests.   
Various executive forums served as focus groups to discuss recurring issues. Results of the 
discussions of the focus groups were captured into Microsoft word documents, and transposed into 
the standardised template developed for this study (Microsoft Excel spreadsheets). 
The Questionnaire was developed to understand why recurring issues were experienced, and 
distributed in Microsoft Excel. The findings were captured into the standardised template developed 
for this study (Microsoft Excel spreadsheets). Results of the questionnaire were reflected back to 
various executive forums in Microsoft Powerpoint presentations, and in various board reports in 
Microsoft Word documents. 
In addition, participants were observed during the respective tests, and the results of these 
observations were captured into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. This was effective in eliciting data on 
the cultural norms of the group and in generating broad overviews of issues of concern to the 
cultural groups or sub-groups represented.   
5.2.2.1 Development of the Questionnaire 
To understand what the underlying causes of the HOT factors were, a questionnaire (Appendix C) 
was distributed to a portion of the sample population, as described in Table 5. Each of the questions 
in the questionnaire was designed to provide insight into the research questions and the 
propositions stated earlier. In most cases the questions could also be mapped to an HOT factor. 
Table 4 shows the mapping of the research questions and propositions, and also expounds on the 
rationale for each particular question. 
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Table 4. The mapping of the questions on the Questionnaire to the research questions, propositions and 
HOT factor categories together with the rationale for each question 
Nr Question Research Question (RQ) HOT Factor 
1 Why do we experience recurring issues during DCN and HA 
tests and how do we prevent these from occurring in 
future? 
RQ 1 - 
2 Which factors contribute to resources not taking corrective 
actions which stem from previous DCN / HA tests?  
RQ 1 - 
12 What must we stop doing? What must we continue doing? 
What must we start doing? 
RQ 2   - 
Questions 1 and 2 stem directly from the Research Question: What are the recurring issues that 
impede effective IT Continuity Management at Company X, and what factors cause them?   
Question 12 is based on the popular ‘Stop/Start/Continue Model’ which is often used with teams 
and individuals (Mills Consulting Group, 2005, pg. 1). It is an effective way to identify and move 
individuals from positions that are creating some level of conflict or have become obstacles to 
performance (Mills Consulting Group, 2005). In this context, it aims to solicit input on how recurring 
issues could be mitigated. 
Nr Question Proposition HOT Factor 
3 IT Continuity is viewed as an overhead, protecting against 
something that may never happen and not contributing 
directly to ‘the bottom-line’. In your view, why is this 
statement justified / not justified? 
3.1.2.3: Cost Justification 
 
Organisational 
Question 3 was postulated in an open-ended manner to elicit the underlying attitude of the 
respondent toward IT Continuity. The idea was to extract a view of whether justification differed per 
organisational level, i.e. did management perhaps have a different view from that of the IT 
developers, and would this then perhaps have had some kind of an impact?  
Nr Question Proposition HOT Factor 
4 Remote Data Centre: End of Life (EOL) Technology is used 
in DCN and thus the infrastructure is quite old.  Thus 
testing is not always like-on-like technology (servers of a 
later generation in production). What is your opinion of the 
statement and how does it impact on you? 
3.1.3.1: Compatibility and 
Complexity 
Technological 
Question 4 concerns the issue of whether compatibility (like-on-like technology) introduces a level of 
complexity (additional effort required because the environments are not the same) to testing, and 
whether this additional effort has influenced the participants’ view of participation in the test. The 
question was phrased to solicit an opinion. 
Nr Question Proposition HOT Factor 
5 In your experience / view, what are the frustrations with IT 
Continuity? 
3.1.2.1:  Available 
Resources 
Organisational 
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The negative, open-ended way in which Question 5 was presented had the objective of eliciting all 
frustrations the testers experienced in order to determine in how many cases lack of time and 
money would be highlighted as obstacles. 
Nr Question Proposition HOT Factor 
6 What must be done to alleviate the frustrations? i.e. How 
can we improve your experience with Continuity?  How do 
we increase the focus and commitment to Continuity 
efforts? 
3.1.2.1:  Available 
Resources 
Organisational 
Question 6 also relates to the proposition around available resources, but, in contrast to Question 5, 
it was phrased in a positive manner to establish what change was needed in the organisation to 
remove obstacles and change the mind-set toward Continuity efforts? 
Nr Question Proposition HOT Factor 
7 What is your manager’s view of IT Continuity efforts? How 
does this impact on / influence your outlook toward 
continuity efforts? 
3.1.1.1: Credibility Human 
Question 7 was developed around the concept of whether management lend credibility to IT 
Continuity, i.e. if the manager was well disposed toward IT continuity, did it automatically infer that 
staff would be well disposed toward continuity efforts?  It also attempted to see if there were 
discrepancies between levels of management, and how their staff performed. 
Nr Question Proposition HOT Factor 
8 Have you ever experienced a disaster?  3.1.1.2: Terms of 
Reference 
Human 
Question 8 was developed to see if experience of a disaster influenced disposition towards IT 
continuity efforts. Thus, the answer to this question has been relayed back to previous answers to 
establish a relationship between xperience of a disaster and attitude. 
Nr Question Proposition HOT Factor 
9 Is IT Continuity justified? 3.1.1.2: Terms of 
Reference 
Human 
Question 9 was posed to counter the cost aspect of IT continuity, i.e. was continuity important to the 
company beyond the cost factor?  It was also positioned around the opportunity cost of effort on IT 
continuity versus the ability to spend time on other activities such as production matters. 
Nr Question Proposition HOT Factor 
10 The DCN tests are bi-annual and because the Mainframe is 
unavailable outside of these slots, testing between these 
phases is not possible. What impact does this have on you? 
3.1.3.2: Trialability / 
Testability 
Technological 
Question 10 was developed to find out if the inability to test outside of designated test slots had an 
impact on the focus on IT continuity. The aim was to understand if the 6-month gap between tests in 
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any way influenced the fact that people did not take corrective actions post-tests, whether it related 
to apathy, or were the gaps between tests too long to keep the momentum going in IT Continuity.  
Nr Question Propositions HOT Factor 
11 Do you receive the necessary support during tests from 
vendors, managers etc. If not, please substantiate your 
answer 
Proposition 3.1.2.1:  
Available Resources 
Organisational 
Question 11 related to the availability of support from managers and from service providers during 
tests, from an operational perspective. 
Nr Question Propositions HOT Factor 
13 "IT Continuity is mandatory and the company can be fined 
if we do not adhere"…are you aware of policies, SLA's etc.?  
If not, what must be done to ensure that such awareness is 
raised? 
Proposition 3.1.2.2: 
Legislation and 
Standards 
Organisational 
Question 13 was developed to try to understand what the level of awareness was around the 
governance of IT continuity, and to understand if people were aware of the repercussions to the 
company and management in their personal capacities if the company did not adhere to continuity 
practices.   
5.2.3 Sample and Target Population 
Purposive sampling was used in this research as a sampling strategy. Participants in the research 
were identified by the management of each department based on their job responsibilities, position, 
and involvement in IT Continuity. Additional respondents were also selected on the basis of the 
researcher’s individual judgment on the grounds that they could provide the necessary information 
needed for the research.  The research targeted people who had direct links with IT Continuity in the 
capacity of providing services, had a dependency on the services rendered by IT Continuity and who 
could, based on experience, provide valuable and relevant input to the research.   The research thus 
also identified specific groups of people who either possessed characteristics or circumstances 
relevant to the social phenomenon being studied. Informants were identified because they enabled 
exploration of a particular aspect of behaviour relevant to the research. 
Table 5 depicts the representation of the population which was reached for the purposes of this 
research.  They were chosen based on position (depth within IT/business) and from a horizontal 
perspective to include both IT and the business.  In addition they had been chosen based on their 
involvement with disaster recovery tests and IT Continuity efforts, whether they had direct 
dependency on IT continuity or provided a service to IT continuity. 
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Role Staff 
Compliment 
Designation / Reason 
IT Executives 3 The main role of the IT executives is to assist with the desired 
positioning of IT as a business partner to Company X. They 
represent both IT in business, and business in IT. They ensure that 
IT understands the business requirements and that business 
understands the IT capacity and capabilities.  
IT Portfolio Heads 3 Heads of IT Development Departments 
CIO’s 4 Chief Information Officers, who are the Heads of the IT Execs, IT 
Portfolio Heads and the Services Line Managers.   
IT Application Owners 15 IT Managers within various application areas and infrastructure 
domains. 
IT Developers 20 Developers of code, support the infrastructure etc. 
Business Disaster Recovery 
Coordinators (BDR’s) 
15 Representatives within the business units with the added 
responsibility of coordinating the testers / business expectations 
around anything Disaster Recovery related especially with the bi-
annual Remote Disaster Recovery tests and High Availability tests 
Project Managers 1 Project Manager involved with the bi-annual Remote Disaster 
Recovery tests and High Availability tests 
Testers 30  Testers who test business data in bi-annual Remote Disaster 
Recovery tests and High Availability tests 
Architects  2 Architects for Disaster Recovery 
Service Line Managers 9 Managers of the various Service streams.  All have some 
dependency on DR and have some contribution to DR in terms of 
DR e.g. the network, data centre infrastructure, design etc. 
Risk 2 Risk Managers who typically assess and monitor the risks to the 
company and have input into DR 
IT Internal Auditor 2 Perform audits on IT Continuity 
Business Continuity Board 5 Board Members who are the custodians of Business Continuity 
for the company 
Service providers 3 Provide Services, Hardware and Network Connectivity within the 
Data centres as well from head office to the Remote Disaster 
Recovery site in Johannesburg 
Manco 9 Management Company of the department which provides IT 
services to the company (and subsidiary companies). IT 
Continuity is a stream in Architecture and Planning portfolio. 
Total 144  
Table 5. Sample employed in the research 
Engagement with resources occurred on several levels, before and during the tests in discussions, via 
the questionnaires, and in follow-up meetings post the findings. Several rounds of verification were 
done with IT Management to ensure that the results of the test (as depicted in the study) were 
representative of the recurring issues experienced.  The findings were also discussed at this level to 
ensure that the results were reflected fairly and without bias. Questionnaires were distributed to 
Service providers, Service Line Managers, IT Development and Application Owners.  Results of the 
questionnaire were presented to focus groups for discussion (Manco and IT Portfolio Heads) and 
then deciphered and presented to IT Executives, the Business Continuity Board and the respective 
CIOs. 
Initially, data was gathered employing Participant Observation, where the researcher observed 
phenomena of interest in the environment studied, to draw information which was not obtainable 
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from other methods.  These observations came from the Remote Data Centre and High Availability 
tests, where resources participating in these tests were observed and notes taken regarding the 
experiences and attitudes.  What had been observed by the researcher was related to the physical 
setting and environment within which the test activities took place. Observation generated insight 
and better understanding on the phenomenon under study. 
In quantitative research the concern with similarity and difference leads to the use of statistical 
sampling so as to maximise external validity or generalisability. Hence, Purposive or Judgmental 
sampling enabled the selection of cases which were particularly informative to the research.  In the 
case of this research, Company X was used and chosen based on the fact that the Company has 
strong senior management commitment to IT Continuity: it does regular tests and subscribes to all 
the best practices as prescribed by COBIT and ITIL.  This approach best enabled the research 
questions to be answered appropriately, and enabled the objectives of the research to be met. 
A homogeneous sampling strategy, or non-probabilistic sampling strategy, was employed to focus on 
particular sub-groups within the organisation, where the sample members are similar so as to add 
depth and commonality across the case study.  The sample was geographically clustered, as all 
participants in this research are confined to one location within one company.  To maintain rigour, 
these participants were chosen to provide the raw material for a comparative analysis, based on the 
fact that they are theoretically informed and hence relevant to the research questions. 
Consideration was given to the issues of Bias and Representativeness, which were mitigated by 
including a broad spectrum of people from various disciplines, various business units and various 
interests in the research, thus mitigating the bias which stems from selecting a sample based on 
convenience.  From an ethics perspective, the research was not biased in terms of gender, 
race/ethnicity, age, location or any other aspect.  The characteristics of the participants involved in 
the research were company employees, ranging from age 18 to retirement age. 
5.2.4 Types of Data and Analysis 
The first round of data analysis entailed deriving the recurring issues from the reports generated 
post the Remote Data Centre tests and High Availability tests.  All issues logged during the tests, as 
well as those issues highlighted in the reports stemming from the tests, were captured in Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheets and categorised according to the incidents logged on the Problem Management 
Tool (a tool used to manage the incident flow in Company X).  A sample of the report generated by 
the Problem Management Tool can be seen in Appendix A. Each issue then underwent an analysis 
process to map them to a HOT factor.  The end result yielded a list of issues mapped to HOT factors.  
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Pivot tables were employed to gain a comparative view between all the tests and thus yielded 
recurring issues. 
Further data analysis was undertaken to establish the link between respondents’ replies and the 
HOT factors.  The analysis was aided by concepts borrowed from grounded theory.  The three stages 
and what they entail are depicted in Figure 12.  Stage one, Open Coding, refers to dis-aggregation of 
data into units, i.e. the results of the issues logged on the problem management tool were 
consolidated and pooled into units across the recovery stack.  They were categorised as belonging to 
hardware, software, network, data, telephony and infrastructure units.  The units were further 
broken down to a more granular level, e.g. in the network unit, items were grouped according to 
slow network response or active directory issues, etc.  Stage two, Axial coding, refers to the process 
of recognising relationships between categories. In this case, each unit was examined and 
relationships in the unit were analysed, e.g. if the network response was slow due to a 2 megabyte 
connection between the Remote Data Centre and Head Office, potential causes such as cost were 
assigned.  Stage three, Selective Coding refers to the integration of categories to align with the 
research purpose. In the case of this study all the items were assigned to a HOT factor, e.g. cost was 
an organisational factor. A sample may be seen in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 12. Three stages of coding borrowed from grounded theory  
“In quantitative research, the emphasis is on collecting data that lead to dependable answers to 
important questions, reported in sufficient detail that it has meaning to the reader. The proto-typical 
qualitative study is the ethnography which helps the reader to understand the definitions of the 
situation of those studies” (Firestone, 1987, p.17).   The main ways in which qualitative researchers 
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ensure the re-test reliability of their analyses is in maintaining meticulous records of observations, 
and by documenting the process of analysis in detail (Mays & Pope, 1995). 
The data was recorded using various methods, e.g. Microsoft Powerpoint presentations to 
graphically depict the recurring issues, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets to record questionnaires, and 
the data collected was stored in a Microsoft Access database.  Hard copies were stored in a file and 
soft copies were stored in a folder on a local drive.  Backups were made to an external drive.  Access 
to the data was password-protected, and several other levels of security were imposed, e.g. 
Windows logon authentication.  I foresee no potential problems with storage or access.  The data is 
confidential and hence strict security measures are in place. 
In addition, the reliability of the analysis of the qualitative data which emerged from the study was 
enhanced by organising an independent assessment of the transcripts by additional skilled 
qualitative researchers (supervisor) and comparing agreement between the participants. 
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6. Findings 
This section contains the findings of comparative year-on-year analysis of the Remote Data Centre 
and High Availability tests, as well as the findings from a questionnaire which were developed in 
response to the findings of the tests.   
6.1 Remote Data Centre (RDC) and High Availability (HA) Test Results 
The results were established by analysing the results of seven IT Continuity tests (four Remote 
Disaster Recovery tests and three High Availability tests) which enkindle the recovery of the entire IT 
stack, namely hardware, software, network, etc.  All the incidents logged on the Problem 
Management Tool were extrapolated and analysed, and a comparative analysis was done between 
the successive years, namely for 2009 and 2010. The data yielded the results as depicted in Figure 
13. 
 
Figure 13. Year-on-Year comparison of issues encountered with the Remote Data Centre and HA Tests 
 
Overall, 2010 fared worse than 2009 in several areas.  There were unique issues identified in 2009 
and 2010, but more worrying is the fact that the overwhelming majority of incidents reported were 
recurring issues in 2009 and 2010.  The number of incidents reported in 2009 which did not occur in 
2010 may have been reduced due to the focus placed on resolving issues prior to the 
May/November 2010 test.  The recurring issues, albeit higher in 2010 than in 2009, are depicted in 
Table 6: 
Unique 2009 Unique 2010 Recurring 2009 and 2010 
 Desktop 
 Firewall 
 Incorrect ports 
 Insufficient storage 
 DB2 Gateway 
 IPL of the Mainframe 
 Port Errors 
 Screen versioning 
 Access to systems (logons etc.)  
 Application errors 
 Applications missing 
 Datasets not available 
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 Service Unavailable 
 
 Images missing 
 IP addresses 
 Job scheduling issues 
 Slow network response issues 
 Servers being unavailable  
 Timeouts 
Table 7. Incidents reported during the RDC tests, year on year comparison 
 
The test results of issues encountered in 2010 are depicted in Figure 14: 
 
Figure 14. The main issues encountered during 2010 
 
Testing is a critical process which should have enabled Company X to validate the disaster recovery 
processes, validate the documentation, allow practice for the employees who participate in the RDC 
and HA tests, and to identify weaknesses in the planning and infrastructure. Recurring issues were 
sensitive because the premise with which tests were approached was that new issues signaled 
learning and progress, making the Company more resilient to disasters. Where recurring issues were 
encountered, it meant that mistakes and errors had been ignored, i.e. we have done nothing to 
mitigate the issue since the last test and ultimately this means we fail the respective RDC and HA 
tests. 
6.1.1 Recurring response issue 
The network response in the DR Lab was extremely slow, to the point that users were unable to 
login and test.  The Company (Head Office) connects to the Remote Data Centre (RDC) via a 2mg 
line.  It could be that this issue was related to the network; alternatively it could have related to the 
multiple connections the applications make in RDC (the way in which the infrastructure is set up).  To 
resolve the slow response, diagnostic tests were run on the line, i.e. the network service-provider 
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monitored the network.  In addition, although the respective infrastructure teams and the DR 
architect re-visited the deployment of the hardware in the Remote Data Centre to aid in the 
resolution of the slow response, neither investigation yielded any insights.  The 2mg line was 
increased to 4mg for the latter (2010) test and, generally, the network response improved. However, 
two applications struggled to sign-off within the agreed SLA.  This was attributed to the decreased 
capacity in the Remote Data Centre, i.e. the Remote Data Centre has about eighty percent of 
production capacity. 
In 2009 the Company experienced the same problem with an application and, after the network was 
monitored, they moved the server to an older host, ESX01, which resolved the issue.  A Root Cause 
Analysis yielded no insights into why the application was so slow on the newer host.   
6.1.2 Access Issues 
Service provider A experienced RACF issues when logging onto the Mainframe and other 
applications. Both IT Development resources and business users experience issues logging on 
because of passwords, etc.  One of the recurring errors was the fact that the password file was not 
restored in the RDC.  The security issue must be addressed both on the database and desktop space.  
A process was implemented to schedule an active directory refresh prior to each test, and this 
partially solved the issues of users and passwords updating in the Remote Data Centre.  However, in 
addition, Application Owners did not submit updated employee codes for people who should have 
been testing in the DR Lab, and hence these resources were not activated to test.   
6.1.3 Documentation/Skill level 
Recurring errors make up the bulk of the time delays during testing.  The Battlebox currently 
contains documentation which is not standardised.  Errors and rectification methods are not 
documented, and hence the Battle box documentation is not on par.  The fear is that in a real 
disaster, where the Company could potentially lose key staff, the available staff would not be able to 
recover applications based on documentation in the Battlebox. 
The BIA (Business Impact Analysis) defines the criticality of the application.  The problem is that 
people verbally justify why the application is critical, but nothing concrete exists for any of the legacy 
systems in the Battlebox to justify why the application is on the critical list.  
6.1.4 Apathy to IT Continuity 
Extensive focus is placed on giving IT an opportunity to resolve all issues stemming from the RDC 
tests.  A week prior to the Remote Data Centre test, an Active Directory (AD) Refresh is scheduled to 
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run and complete over two days, giving the IT Development resources 3 days to test the critical 
applications in the Remote Data Centre.  This event is scheduled precisely a week prior to the 
Remote Data Centre test to resolve any application/security-based problems.  Generally the 
response of the IT Development resources was poor, with only 2 out of 62 application areas (3%) 
testing if their applications were available.  The direct effect is that many of the issues encountered 
during the Remote Data Centre test could have been mitigated during the AD Refresh if testing had 
been done as scheduled.    
IT operational readiness testing normally commences on a Sunday when Service Provider B hands 
over the RDC environment to Company X.  During the May 2010 test, the RDC environment was 
handed over to Company X only late on Monday afternoon.  Immediate notification was sent to the 
IT Development resources to commence testing.    27% of IT Development resources started testing 
immediately, while 73% started testing on Tuesday.  The direct impact resulted in delays as 
resources were not available to test.  A secondary spin-off was that, as some areas are dependent on 
others to complete before starting their tests, their testing was also delayed. 
Taking into account the previous RDC tests, an audit finding for 2011 noted that, while technical 
resources sign off on the IT Operational Readiness testing, there is no evidence of the detail of what 
they sign off on.   
The results of the RDC tests in 2009 and 2010 prompted investigation into the factors which cause 
recurring issues and the perceived apathy in the IT Continuity environment.  Based on the results of 
the RDC tests, a questionnaire was developed and distributed to 59 resources, from whom 38 
responses were received, a return of sixty five percent.  This number excludes the audit findings 
which were also taken into account for the purposes of the study.  The results of the respondents 
were captured, consolidated and analysed.  The emergent findings, which are discussed in the next 
section, were reflected back to the Application Owners, IT Executive Committee, IT Infrastructure 
Management Committee and the Business Continuity Board for verification.   
6.2 Results of the Questionnaire 
Based on the results of the comparative year-on-year tests done above, a questionnaire was 
developed and distributed to participants of the test.  The input from the questionnaire was 
consolidated, analysed and grouped according to emergent themes. The findings of the 
questionnaire were reflected back to the executive committee for comment, on both a group level 
and on an individual level.  The section below contains the results of these interactions.  The 
following section contains direct quotes from participants in the study, and it was felt that tampering 
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with the quotes could affect the authenticity of the results, hence there may be grammatical errors 
in some of the quotes. 
6.2.1 Question 1: Why do we experience recurring issues during the RDC tests and how do we 
prevent these from occurring in future? 
Table 7 lists all the factors cited by respondents for the existence of recurring issues during the 
Remote Data Centre (RDC) tests.  The lack of documentation was cited as the top factor for the 
experience of recurring of issues during DR tests.   It seems the lack of visibility into what caused 
previous issues, how they were mitigated, and what short-term fixes were implemented to negate 
the issues, are the greatest shortcomings in dealing with issues.  One of the respondents succinctly 
summed-up this sentiment in the statement “we do not learn out of previous mistakes”.  Three 
themes seem to emerge as the solution for documentation, namely that a registry should exist for 
documentation which contains a list of all the problems experienced, the registry should be in a 
central location so that all people are able to access and view the registry, and the registry should be 
maintained and updated on a regular basis.   
Factor 
influencing 
Recurring 
Issues 
Comments from respondents 
Documentation There is no register on how the problems was solved or what work around was implemented 
Resolutions are not properly documented 
Issues and the fixes don't get properly documented 
Update documentation i.e. problems and solutions in a central place easy for lookup by all 
The impression I get is that issues are raised, sorted out so that testing can continue, but not 
documented and as a result does not become part of BAU (Business as Usual) 
All problems should be listed 
Different resources performing DR test and not being aware of previous issues 
Lack of Time Not enough time 
Dedicated time is not made available for this 
Processes Lack of a clear cut process 
Update process where required, i.e. to improve the sequence due to interdependencies 
Need more structure for initial setup process, in other words, time frames for installation of:  1.  
AD Refresh  2.  MQ  3.  Mainframe  4.  Workflow  5.  DB2  6.  SCCM Profiles available  7.  DBA 8.  
Lamda 9.  Terminal Services Setup 
Accountability Nobody is looking at problems experienced during previous exercises 
Someone must make sure those problems are addressed before the next exercise. 
DR accountability must be vested in teams 
KPAs must be linked to it 
Communication Lack of communication. Set up processes to promote this. 
Lack of Focus All personal must be made more aware of the reasons why we have a DR site 
Resource 
Unavailability 
Dedicated resources are not made available for this. 
Planning Bad Planning 
Sourcing of technical resources according to responsibility 
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Change 
Management 
Changes in the South not necessarily applied in RDC (the remote data centre) 
DR must be seen as production 
Keep DR North in sync with Prod i.e. especially with the clustered environments 
Environment Unavailability of environment during the year 
Low Priority Too many higher priority tasks 
DR is seen unnecessary and has low priority with everyone 
DR is not really a focussed area for Business - it is an "IT problem" 
Follow up Have a post mortem to Identify follow-up actions 
Table 7.  Responses to Factors which influence the recurrence of issues during tests 
Lack of accountability was also cited as a cause of recurring issues during RDC tests.  Accountability 
for the documentation of issues experienced, and for the subsequent corrective actions that stem 
from these issues, “must be vested in teams”.   In a follow-up discussion with the Head of 
Architecture and Planning, “the respective application teams must take accountability by signing off 
on the reports which are generated during the tests, i.e. that they accept the report and the 
consequent corrective actions to mitigate the issues, or they reject the report and provide the 
justifications” (personal communication).  The issue which arises out of this is that, despite the 
current process in place to sign off on the report, there are no “consequences” for not taking the 
necessary corrective actions, and the potential solution would be to “link the KPA’s (key 
performance attributes) to the RDC”. 
The change management process is cited as contributing to the experience of recurring issues.  
Changes made in production are not applied to the RDC, and hence the RDC lags behind in terms of 
patches applied, versions of the software in production versus versions running in the RDC, 
application changes, etc., and accounts for most of the issues experienced during the RDC tests.  
Currently, in Company X, the Change Management process is automated via a tool which has an 
“RDC impact” checkbox which, if ticked, would spawn a child log for the change to be applied to the 
RDC.  However, this check box is rarely checked, hence the changes are not applied to the RDC, 
resulting in the impact experienced during the next RDC test.  One respondent made an important 
observation by stating that “DR must be seen as production”, i.e. from an IT point of view there 
should be no distinction made between production and the RDC, and the RDC should form a natural 
part of day-to-day tasks.  As a corrective measure, it was suggested that the “RDC impact” checkbox 
be made a mandatory field to “force the IT Development teams to think actively about applying the 
changes to critical systems in the RDC”.  An additional suggestion is to routinely flag all critical 
systems to be automatically updated in the RDC. 
Central to the Change Management Process is the lack of time and resources available for the RDC.  
Respondents concisely summed up the situation: “there is not enough dedicated time and resources 
made available for RDC” and “there is just not enough time”.  The unavailability of the disaster 
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recovery environment between the bi-annual tests meant that there were only two opportunities to 
test and verify that the production and RDC environments were in sync.  This had an impact on 
recurring issues in that corrective actions could not be tested before the next scheduled test.  RDC 
and HA testing is a bi-annual occurrence, and it has a direct impact on the focus which resources 
place on IT Continuity.  Consistent with this idea is that “social hazards” encountered on a daily 
basis, or whose existence and implications are reiterated through regular attention, are perceived as 
more salient, and thus during quiescence periods when readiness work must take place, natural 
hazards will compete with their social counterparts for attention, with the salience or otherwise of a 
hazard (natural or otherwise) evident in how much people think and talk about it.  The relative 
importance of natural hazards will be reflected in the frequency with which people discuss them, 
and this renders critical awareness as a potentially important precursor variable (Paton, 2003).  A 
comprehensive and continuous focus on IT Continuity should be maintained, and it was mentioned 
that: “we are not talking about it enough, we are not testing enough and hence the awareness not 
there”. Respondents also felt that the solution would need to include more focus and awareness:  
“all personnel must be made more aware of the reasons why we have a Disaster Recovery (DR) site”. 
The lack of commitment to IT Continuity is substantiated by three factors, namely: “Too many higher 
priority tasks”, i.e. production issues take precedence (because of the above-mentioned factors). 
This is substantiated by the comment “To me it is a job that has to be done so the sooner I can get it 
done the sooner I can get back to the live environment and other projects that is on my plate”; “DR 
is not really a focused area for Business - it is an ‘IT problem’", i.e. business only feels the impact of 
production issues and does not directly feel the impact of an application not working in DR.  Because 
they are not affected they place minimal focus on DR and it becomes an IT responsibility; and “DR is 
seen unnecessary and has a low priority with everyone”.  Another respondent stated “we are all very 
positive about it, but it is a side show at present”. 
The lack of clear processes before and during tests, the lack of communication, and the lack of the 
RDC test as a project have also been cited as affecting planning and focus for IT Continuity.  A 
collaborative Project Team must be incorporated into planning: “My suggestion is that all the people 
involved should meet daily during the DR exercise, and next steps should be communicated and 
issues addressed, as if in a real DR situation”.  And a “party from IT Infrastructure and  IT 
Development should be accountable to table the report with mitigation actions and timelines”. 
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6.2.2 Question 2: Which factors contribute to resources not taking corrective actions which stem 
from previous RDC/HA tests? 
As portrayed in Table 8, one of the biggest factors which contribute to resources not taking the 
necessary corrective actions which stem from previous RDC tests, is the lack of time and resource 
availability.  Production, day-to-day tasks and project priorities place constraints on the capacity of 
teams to devoting effort to corrective actions.  One respondent aptly described the current scenario 
as “things (DR related tasks) are neglected during BAU which in turn affects other priorities and 
resource time”.  Another respondent stated “Yes I know when the next RDC test is, but we get busy 
with other tasks and tend to forget because it is not on our 'normal' task list”.    
The time and effort required to apply corrective actions in the RDC is also constrained by the fact 
that applications have infrastructure and other application dependencies, and it becomes difficult to 
coherently coordinate the time and efforts of the respective teams outside of the RDC/HA tests.  
This frustration is especially evident when new resources step in and are perhaps not as efficient or 
experienced as the regular resources who normally test DR.  In addition, changes made to RDC 
cannot be tested in full because all systems are available only in a RDC exercise. 
Factor influencing 
Corrective Actions 
Comments from respondents 
Lack of Time and 
Resources 
Not enough time, too many higher priority tasks 
Team capacity constraints 
Dedicated time/resources are not made available for this. 
Workload in south and effort “applying” in in RDC 
Application and 
Infrastructure 
Interdependencies 
The fact that we all have dependencies on each other. However each department 
focuses on their part of the DR. Many a time other departments signed off on their part 
of the DR and when we start testing we still find "errors" emanating from their 
applications. 
Accountability Nobody takes control and make sure that all problems are addressed on a permanent 
basis 
Resources do not take ownership 
Not managed by accountable managers 
DR accountability must be vested in teams 
Nobody takes responsibility and there are no “repercussions” 
Low Priority DR is seen unnecessary and has low priority with everyone 
Maybe the sense for importance of DR capability is not vested across all levels of 
resources 
Production support takes priority 
DR is not really a focussed area for Business - it is an "IT problem" 
New Resources Often new people involved which do not help continuity 
Skills and Knowledge Not all knowledge in one person.   DR requires a person who has knowledge of the 
interfaces and open systems.  An architect to orchestrate the successful flow of events 
and dependencies. 
Central person / architect to take control that understands and has knowledge of 
systems and interfaces. 
Table 8.  Response on Factors which contribute to resources not taking the corrective actions from previous RDC tests. 
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Respondents also cited lack of visibility into, and presence of, an end-to-end architect who is 
intimately familiar with inter-dependencies between applications, infrastructure and interfaces as a 
source of recurring issues.  Recurrent is the theme of lack of accountability as a reason why 
corrective actions are not taken and hence recurring issues being prevalent.   
Consistent with the view that “people tend to be uninterested in and unwilling to take action for 
preparedness and to reduce the risk” (Tekeli-Yesil, 2006), respondents cited that “DR is seen 
unnecessary and has low priority with everyone”.  Interesting to note are the potential differing 
levels of DR priorities across teams.   However, this was not a focus of the investigation. 
An absence of belief in the effectiveness of the measures (outcome expectancy) and fatalism were 
mentioned in past studies as factors discouraging preparedness (Tekeli-Yesil et al., 2010).  From the 
research, fatalism does not emerge as a factor prohibiting the efforts associated with preparedness.  
The absence of belief in effectiveness came through quite strongly: “IT Continuity is never a true 
reflection of what a DR situation is.  Memory sticks and ‘ad hoc’ restores do not reflect our ability to 
‘continue’ with business in RDC” and “Not as it is done currently – Currently it is smoke and mirrors”.   
6.2.3 Question 3: IT Continuity is viewed as an overhead, protecting against something that may 
never happen and not contributing directly to ‘the bottom-line’. In your view, why is this 
statement justified/not justified? 
All respondents cited the statement as not justified: “We are in the Insurance business so there is no 
reason why we should not understand that we need to make provision for future disasters in our 
lifetime with appropriate plans in place”.  The comments, as depicted in Table 9, yielded insights into 
why respondents thought DR is important, e.g. the lack of preparation and planning could affect the 
share price, bottom line and sustainability of the company.  
Comments from respondents 
A real disaster will have a major effect/impact on the company’s bottom line if we are not prepared. 
It is necessary because if a disaster strikes and there is no IT Continuity plans in place there will be no 
bottom line 
Disasters can happen at any anytime and could leave a company crippled 
Is required as a safety measure 
DR capability has an impact on our share price 
It is necessary in case something should happen 
It is for the same reason people have house hold insurance.  This can have a critical impact on the business 
if not in place. 
IT Continuity is a form of Business Insurance 
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This is part of my company's bottom line. 
Table 9. Reasons why DR is important. 
There was no difference in the strong sentiment shared between the levels of people surveyed, with 
comments such as “this (DR) is a must for all businesses; it must happen; it is a must do; we must be 
prepared”. However, despite the strong sentiment, there are negative connotations associated with 
IT Continuity as indicated by the statement “it is not justified, but in many cases it is unfortunately 
how it is perceived” and “this will always be a necessary evil for IT guys.  Evil because we have to 
make do with an environment that is ‘half baked’ because of cost”.  A solution was proposed by a 
respondent: “To cater for the work that IT Continuity need from the different areas, each area head 
must "budget" for continuity testing.    This must also be taken into account with the supply and 
demand processes and the allocation of resource time”. 
Given that no BIA has been completed for any of the legacy systems which are critical and exist in 
the Battlebox, a subsequent BIA process, with documentation, was designed in conjunction with Risk 
Management to ensure that departments look holistically at the reasons why an application is 
deemed critical.  In this regard, BIA documentation was requested for a “like for like” replacement of 
Lotus Notes (old legacy) with Exchange (new).  The response from a very senior IT executive was 
“sorry, this is red-tape and I am not going to participate in it - waste of time”.   The response from 
the architect was equally negative.  The frustration from the IT Continuity Coordinator’s perspective 
is “if you cannot justify why an application is critical, it is akin to not being able to justify why IT 
Continuity exists.  I have nothing concrete to justify the existence of anything on the critical list.  
People are loathe to transfer their implicit knowledge and experience to something tacit like a BIA 
because they see it as a waste of time.  If the senior executives think it is a waste of time, imagine 
the struggle to convince people lower down to complete the documentation”. 
6.2.4 Question 4: Remote Data Centre: End of Life (EOL) Technology is used in RDC and thus the 
infrastructure is quite old.  Thus testing is not always like on like technology (servers of a 
later generation in production). What is your opinion of the statement and how does it 
impact on you? 
Fifty four percent of respondents felt that “problems encountered are not related to so-called ‘old 
technology’".  Forty six percent of respondents felt that they are directly impacted by the 
infrastructure differences and technology, which is not mirroring production as indicated by the 
statement “I personally feel DR infrastructure is not really capable of supporting Business Continuity. 
The hardware is outdated, slow, and potentially problematic and will most probably crack at the first 
sign of load”. 
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Most of the respondents felt, however, that, while they were not directly impacted, the different 
environments logically mean that in the event that the Company experiences a disaster, it would be 
problematic: “In order to re-create the Prod environment, the Lab (RDC) must equal production, 
otherwise the test does not make sense”, “I think that DR centres should be the same as the 'live' 
data centres. This could heavily impact application/service integrity if a disaster should occur” and 
sentiments are summed up in the statement “It is important to simulate a DR exercise as real as 
possible”. 
The real impact of not having the environments mirror each other relates to the work effort which 
must be undertaken to get things to work in the RDC environment: “this impacts negatively on the 
developers who try and keep the systems (applications) the same.  If it is a long cumbersome 
process the systems will most likely drift apart as a lot is done in 6 months between the tests” and 
“The setup is not exactly the same as Production, hence changes cause delays, e.g. Terminal Services 
requires specific changes each DR because of the unique DR setup”. Suggestions to improve the 
different environments relate to “consider documenting the differences between DR and PROD”. 
6.2.5 Question 5: In your experience/view, what are the frustrations with IT Continuity? 
The results of the survey have yielded four classifications which cause frustration, namely culture, 
Process/focus, resource/time availability, and environment/infrastructure.   
“Culture is not a static ‘thing’ but something which everyone is constantly creating, affirming and 
expressing.  Organisation culture is the emergent result of the continuing negotiations about values, 
meanings and proprieties between the members of that organisation and with its environment”, i.e. 
culture is the result of all the daily conversations and negotiations between the members of an 
organisation (Seel, 2000).  According to this theme, from an organisational error perspective, the 
culture (as depicted in Table 10) of blame, commitment and communication can be changed by 
engaging and negotiating constantly and consistently.   
Culture Process / Focus Resource / Time 
Availability 
Environment /  
Infrastructure 
Communication and 
organizing of the DR. Mails 
that are sent out late for 
example. 
Big focus before tests which 
causes "panic", Rush jobs to 
do "catch up" 
Not enough time Infrastructure and 
connection speed is 
frustrating 
Blame Structured project plan with 
realistic timelines 
Too many higher priority 
tasks 
Inadequate hardware and 
resources 
Too much focus on petty 
stuff (SLA missed with 30 
minutes with valid reason) 
Need more detail planning 
regarding testing 
Lack of resources Slow Lab and response speed 
& capacity 
Finger pointing 
 
Bad planning from business It is a part-time job which 
always happens at the wrong 
Environment (emulators) was 
not ready last time 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
Coursework and Dissertation Masters Programme: Information Systems 2010 
 
 
Page 74 of 112 
 
time 
Communication Lack of a test plan and 
Project plan with dates, times 
and names of people 
involved 
Not always opportune time 
to test 
Speed - the more users, the 
slower the response 
Commitment Communication: consider 
booking a timeslot in each 
manager's calendar to 
emphasize the kick-off of a 
DR 
Knock-on effect of initial 
delays and then having to 
come in over weekends 
Quick, temporary solutions. 
Not having remote access. 
Table10. Greatest frustrations with IT Continuity. 
The results reveal that constant and consistent focus be maintained throughout the year in the IT 
Continuity sphere to prevent the hype and panic which is created before each test.  The 
communication of a concise test plan will alleviate the frustrations encountered with planning 
resource availability.  From a technological error perspective, the environment causes frustration in 
that the 2Megabyte link between RDC and the laboratory where the tests are conducted are slow, 
especially when multiple users are testing simultaneously.  Providing remote access for resources to 
nurse the backups and restores from home will ensure that people are less frustrated with having to 
spend 54 hours, the time it takes to execute the DB2 restores, at work to get the jobs through.  
Hardware, sufficient storage and capacity are also cited as causes of frustration. 
6.2.6 Question 6: What must be done to alleviate the frustrations? i.e. How can we improve 
your experience with IT Continuity?  How do we increase the focus and commitment to 
Continuity efforts? 
From the responses below, depicted in Table 11, it became apparent that constant communication, 
education and awareness are necessary to maintain the focus on DR.  The organisations we create to 
build and manage economies, infrastructure and communities incubate hazards with the potential to 
trigger incidents and disasters (Chapman, 2005).  To manage this effectively, clear processes are 
required to plan and manage the DR tests which include the Project Management Office as well as 
the Change Management Process.  The end-to-end process should include not only the report which 
highlights issues encountered during the tests, but the corrective actions required, and a follow up 
to ensure that corrective actions are implemented and that the issues have been resolved and the 
risk mitigated. 
Factor Comment 
Awareness and  
Education 
Awareness. Strategy shift in times of EOL (End of Life) hardware. We can just prolong 
the periods between hardware refresh. 
DR readiness must be understood 
Focus Ensure DR has the required focus 
The commitment is there, but the focus could be improved 
Corrective Actions All problems encountered must be attended to before next exercise. 
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 Check all previous post-mortem activities completed. 
Communication Better communication - what is the expected outcome, what is being tested when 
Communication: consider booking a timeslot in each manager's calendar for a kick-off 
meeting (pre-test meeting)  
All the people involved should meet daily during the DR exercise, and next steps 
should be communicated and issues addressed. As if in a real DR situation 
Project Office / Task Allocate time with PM/Task manager to be included in plan long before testing date. 
It must be done. If it was planned better and added to task plan, the morale will not be 
so low.  
Structured / Project plan to get DR up 
Having a Test Plan / Project plan with all setup activities according to their 
interdependencies, dates, times and names of people involved. 
Recognition Reward and recognise people or departments that have done great. Yes it is a short 
term motivator but it can lead to long term success. 
Give credit where it's due. Don't slap a person (provider) for breaching with an half 
hour while the issue causing it was raised to all powers to be. 
Infrastructure In the Document Management environment we have applications with a DR capability 
but it must be on the “live” company WAN, not separate as in DR 
Explore replacing Terminal services (TS) with VM or other similar like production 
Provide remote access 
Provide more bandwidth 
Backup and Recovery By making the process to keep the systems in sync as fast and painless as possible for 
developers. 
A process to continually update Terminal Services in DR 
Business buy in What I'm going to do myself in the new year is to ensure that we get much better buy 
in from the users and ensure that training/communication happens properly going 
forward. That should overcome the issue of testers arriving unprepared 
Follow up Have a proper follow up process in place to make sure all issues are resolved as soon 
as possible after an exercise 
Documentation Frequently Asked Questions 
Change Management Continuous updating of software as production software is changed 
 
Table 11. Factors and Actions to alleviate the frustrations/issues within IT Continuity 
Regarding the environment and infrastructure frustrations, respondents felt that more resources 
(network, hardware. etc.) need to be implemented to provide an environment which is conducive to 
testing.  This can only be achieved by a closer relationship between IT and the business, and a 
clearer focus on the importance of DR as a business fund DR initiative.  It is not only a money issue, 
but a process issue as well, e.g. If business and IT define and manage backups and restores 
effectively, the funds required to procure additional storage requirements could be diverted to 
improving the infrastructure. 
Recognition is one of the major issues lacking in DR.  The Company is so prone to laying issues on 
scapegoats that no effort is directed at rewarding or recognising DR efforts.   
6.2.7 Question 7: What is your manager’s view of IT Continuity efforts? How does this impact 
on/influence your outlook toward continuity efforts? 
Forty per cent of respondents were unaware of their manager’s perception of IT Continuity, while, of 
the sixty per cent who were aware of their manager’s perceptions, 4% responded that the manager 
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perceived IT Continuity as “inconvenient”.  Forty per cent indicated that they share the views held by 
their managers, with comments such as: “We share the same sentiments as it is the cornerstone of 
sustainability”, “100% commitment” and “DR is on both our KPA's. Need I say more?”. The gap 
between board level commitment and the lack of commitment operationally could be attributed to 
the lack of communication filtering down.  As a respondent succinctly put it: “It could be that senior 
management doesn’t spread the commitment and message of importance”. 
 
6.2.8 Question 8: Have you ever experienced a disaster? 
In response to the question “Have you ever experienced a disaster”, 63% of respondents indicated 
that they had never experienced a disaster, and of the 37% who indicated that they had experienced 
a disaster, only 4% indicated that the disaster was of a serious nature, while the balance indicated 
that the disaster was not significant enough to merit an invocation of the RDC.  Table 12 reflects the 
magnitude of disasters experienced by people who participated in the questionnaire. 
Magnitude of Disaster Comments from respondents 
Severe Fire at one department years ago 
Non Severe Personal PC (data loss due to hard drive crash) 
Only on small scale. 
Not in a business sense 
Backed up data was corrupt. Resulting in massive rework and loss of time 
and money and effort to business 
Only on small scale. When the server was not available for a full day and a 
half due to connection problems. 
Only on small scale e.g. power outage, localised issues etc. 
Table 12. Experiences of Disasters 
Not until a disaster happens and severe losses are experienced do people realise the need for 
disaster preparedness, i.e. efforts are made after the event, and pre-disaster preparedness is not 
high on the list of priorities in the absence of this (Shaw et al., 2004).   Consistent with literature, the 
sentiment was succinctly summed up in the statement “we have not had a DR yet - so no pain no 
gain. People do not understand that our DR capability has an impact on, for instance, our share 
price. No one has really been put to the sword on DR” and “because people do not fully understand 
it, they see it as it will never happen”.  The survey also reflects that fifty percent of companies 
implemented disaster preparedness plans after experiencing an outage and/or data loss, while only 
28 percent have actually tested their recovery plans (Continuity Central, 2011).  
Concerning disasters and participation in preparedness, some level of fatalism is prevalent in society, 
which mean that all deeds are believed to be pre-ordained and arranged by God, and hence the 
individual can do little to change the course of action. When taken in the context of disaster 
management, individuals in fatalistic societies would perceive that there is little or no use in taking 
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preventive measures, such as preparedness and mitigation. It also reflects a relief strategy that 
focuses on what to do after the disaster rather than focusing on what can be done before the 
disaster (Inelmen et al., 2004).   
Literature suggests that, despite the acknowledgement of the threat, the level of personal risk 
perception is low, and it could therefore account for the low level of commitment.  “Disasters can 
happen and did happen in Company X years ago when a whole department was burned down”.  Risk 
perception is related to three major factors: dread, familiarity and exposure (Shaw et al., 2004).   As 
indicated from the results above, familiarity and exposure to disaster are extremely low, hence the 
factor of dread is also low.  This could account for the dichotomy between awareness indicated by 
comments such as “Disasters can happen at any time” versus the reality of commitment to 
preparedness.  
6.2.9 Question 9: Is IT Continuity justified? 
Risk reduction behaviour is not only delivering the information or message, but is related to a 
complex factor of personal evaluation process including prior attitudes.  The risk communication 
process depends on socio-economic and cultural issues.  These factors relate to preparedness: 
perceived risk, amount of relevant information, level of past damages, salience of hazard, and level 
of knowledge about the threat (Shaw et al., 2004). 
A large number of respondents (88%) acknowledge that IT Continuity is justified.  Table 13 reflects a 
few of the attitudes regarding the justification. 
Respondent Comment 
R1 It's not justified but it is insurance that you need to take out if you are responsible and 
want to see your company as a sustainable business 
R5 It makes or breaks a business should you not have it 
R13 Need to be prepared 
R7, R12, R21 Absolutely / Definitely / Critical 
Table 13.  Comments supporting the justification of IT Continuity 
The rest of the respondents (12% ) did not think IT Continuity was justified, although it would appear 
from the comments in Table 14 that this reasoning is related to processes which are failing, to 
insufficient communication, and to lack of focus. 
Respondent Comment 
R2 DR is seen unnecessary and has low priority with everyone 
R6 Not as it is done currently – Currently it is smoke and mirrors 
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R12 It is a side show at present 
R13 It is inconvenient 
R4 It must be done. If it was planned better and added to task plan, the morale will not be so 
low. 
Table 14.  Comments highlighting process failures with IT Continuity. 
6.2.10 Question 10: The RDC tests are bi-annual and because the Mainframe is unavailable 
outside of these slots, testing between these phases is not possible. What impact does this 
have on you? 
The RDC environment is split between Mainframe (MF) and Open Systems (OSY).  The OSY 
environment is available throughout the year and, due to the costs associated with the MF, it is 
brought up to 650 MIPS for the 10 days of testing only.  Hence all OSY applications which have MF 
dependencies are affected as well as those applications which are fully MF dependent.  The question 
was to ascertain the impact the unavailability of the MF outside of RDC tests had on recurring issues.  
It was indicated by 16% of the respondents that the unavailability of the Mainframe affected them 
(Table 15),  while 84% of the respondents experienced no impact, or felt that changes done to 
production should be part of business as usual (BAU) activities and therefore should have no impact. 
Impact Percentage Respondent Comment 
High 16% MASSIVE!  ALL OUR APPS are dependent on Mainframe, to keep them 
“current” and to test changes made in the South that is applied at Remote 
Data Centre 
The “application” requires mainframe availability 
At present it will have a big impact as a lot of our business is still on the 
Mainframe. However, in a year or so from now, the mainframe will not be the 
issue but rather the open systems Disaster Recovery 
Low 84% DR testing should be close to a formality if BAU updates are done during the 
year as they should be 
Not a big issue / None / Minimal / No impact 
Table 15. Impact of the inability to test outside of RDC slots. 
 
6.2.11 Question 11: Do you receive the necessary support during tests from service providers, 
managers, etc. If not, please substantiate your answer 
The aim of this particular question was to ascertain if the necessary support was being given during 
the RDC tests and if the absence/presence of support had any impact on recurring issues.  Of all 
respondents, 64% claimed that the necessary support is available during testing.  Of the other 36%, 
several pointed to the fact that between service providers who offer the services to IT Continuity, 
the lack of knowledge and trust is a factor which hampers continuity efforts and the resolving of 
recurring issues (Table 16). 
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 Comment 
Knowledge Vendor A should be more knowledgeable and should take more care when restoring 
data 
 Ensure knowledge in the ‘Vendor A’ team 
Trust We share information between service providers when working together and the 
same information is used against us when SLA's are breached 
Handover Many a time the other applications already signed off and when we get there we get 
errors and they need to come back and fix it. 
IT versus Business Not always from business 
Table 16. Impact of Vendor support on DR Tests 
A noteworthy point is that the necessary support is not always obtained from business.  The project 
manager who liaises with business resources regarding the test commented on the unpreparedness 
of business regarding the tests: “when I called the users they were surprised that they were needed 
as no one had informed them.  Some of them come to the Lab with no test cases prepared or 
documentation of any sort.  Some of them had absolutely no idea of what they should be doing 
much less testing”.  This would indicate that the support of management on the business side is 
absent and that the necessary communication is not taking place. 
6.2.12 Question 12: What must we stop doing? What must we continue doing? What must we 
start doing? 
In response to the behaviour that must be discontinued, activities under three emergent themes 
were highlighted, as depicted in Table 17.  There is a perception of blame and a negativity culture in 
the Continuity sphere which respondents have highlighted. An organisational blame culture is 
defined as “the team is so busy engaged in guerrilla tactics to survive, that they do not perform 
anywhere near their capacity.  Th  organisation still runs, but often key members spend more than 
60% of their time on protection tasks.  Removing the blame culture not only lifts motivation and 
productivity substantially, it multiplies results” (Anderson, 2009). 
Factor Comment 
Culture Stop blaming people 
Stop hammering on stuff that’s not important and focus on what is 
Stop being so negative about the DR testing 
Communication / Reporting Communication on errors and how it is communicated is not always accurate.  
If not communicated correctly, an incorrect impression can be created with 
Management 
Hardware Stop using old EOL hardware 
Table 17. Behaviours/Actions/Factors that need to stop 
 
The other aspect of the blame culture in the work environment is that “in a blame culture words are 
heard from that frame”, i.e. negatively, and the blame “paradigm encourages certain types of 
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behaviour”, i.e. people will behave in blaming ways (Seel, 2000).  To improve on this blame culture 
we need to ensure that those employees who err, understand both the severity of their actions and 
the appropriate action they should have taken instead.  This requires a behavioural change which is 
not part of this research.  “Trust is a key element of a reporting culture and this, in turn, requires the 
existence of a just culture—one possessing a collective understanding of where the line should be 
drawn between blameless and blameworthy actions. Engineering a just culture is an essential early 
step in creating a safe culture” (Reason, 2000).   Reporting on errors must be altered to reflect the 
true state of affairs so as to manage perceptions, and the hardware employed must be more up to 
date. 
What the Company must start doing to improve the IT Continuity portfolio is to ensure that all the 
suggestions are taken cognizance of, and continue to strive to improve the process.  An attempt 
must be made to multi-skill resources and expose all resources to DR.  In terms of the environment, 
the Company should implement practical steps such as increasing the network speed and using 
more up-to-date technology (which mirrors production as much as possible).  Improving the 
processes for testing such as introducing defined test schedules would go a long way toward 
alleviating frustrations.  On a softer side, and more difficult to implement, is the fact that business 
needs to take ownership of DR.  Since business defines the applications which are critical to them, 
and also carries the cost of the critical applications in DR, the accountability and responsibility for DR 
must vest with business and not with IT.  
 Table 18 represents the factors, actions and behaviours which the Company must strive for to 
alleviate frustration and improve continuity efforts. 
Factor Comment 
Environment Ensure we address the feedback 
Working as a team 
Continuously improve the process 
Strive to become market leaders in Continuity instead of market followers.  
Everyone has got Continuity, what makes the company's plan unique in the 
Financial sector? 
Resources and Skill Much of the RDC setup is manual tasks with knowledgeable people attending 
to it. In a disaster those people will most probably not be available to do the 
setup. How to fix this with "Not enough time, too many higher priority tasks" 
is another issue. 
Hardware Better speed 
 Start using new hardware and VMWareconsistently to deploy machines and 
prolong the hardware refresh periods. 
 Test schedules 
Accountability Operations side of business should take much more ownership and actually 
own the DR solution and not IT.  At present it is IT that needs to convince a 
very reluctant operations that this is important 
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Table 18. Behaviours/Actions/Factors that need to start 
Table 19 represents the factors, actions and behaviours which the Company must maintain.  They 
are the constant improvements to backup and restore procedures, the reporting during and after 
RDC tests, the current communication around the tests, and the focus which would(might) have 
been introduced the previous year. 
Factor Comment 
Backup and Restore Have a health check report on all restores in DR as to the success of each procedure 
that had to be completed. 
Reporting Ensure that the same problems do not occur with every DR exercise 
List the recurring issues and ensure that they do not happen again. 
Communication The communication is good keep it up 
Focus Continue to give it a high focus within IT and business. 
 Make sure DR has the required visibility in all environments 
Table 19. Behaviours / Actions / Factors that need to continue. 
 
6.2.13 Question 13: "IT Continuity is mandatory and the company can be fined if we do not 
adhere"…are you aware of policies, SLA's etc.?  If not, what must be done to ensure that 
such awareness is raised? 
It is frequently assumed that providing information on disasters and how to mitigate their 
consequences will encourage preparation, but this assumption is unfounded because considerable 
effort and expenditure on education and levels of preparedness remain low (Paton, 2003).  
Consistent with this theme is the fact that, despite an IT-wide communication session, 48% of 
respondents remain unaware of any policies or governance around IT Continuity, indicating a need 
for more effort and expenditure on education.  Of the 52% that are aware of the policies, etc., the 
majority of the respondents learned this information from the Company-wide education drive, as 
indicated by the statement “the insert in the communication session in the CR Louw (lecture hall) 
was a good beginning”.   
The culture of disaster preparedness is vital and, to build this culture, education is one of the key 
tools (Shaw et al., 2004).  In terms of the latter part of the question, what must be done to increase 
the focus, consistent with literature, is the need to highlight these policies via constant awareness 
drives: “a simple communication will do; constant awareness; communicate more and make it 
visible to business”.  People are quite eager to learn more about these policies: “more information 
would be good like fines, policies, SLA’s etc.; I would like to know more about the policies and fines 
that the company would face if we do not adhere”.  At the Company communication session, the 
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current SLAs were highlighted, and a comment from this was: “I must adhere to a 24 hour SLA for 
MF recovery; I have never seen the SLA”.  This indicates that people, once aware, are seeking to 
increase their knowledge in this domain. 
Respondents felt that managers are the predominant mediums through which these education 
drives should take place: “Management needs to talk to staff on a regular basis about this; Ignorant 
managers should be forced to take responsibility for their teams; provide the accountable line 
managers with enough information to understand the necessity of DR. They have to instill the 
awareness in their teams and DR must be in their KPAs and job descriptions (if not already there)”.  
Other mediums of education suggested were to “conduct workshops and add the policies, 
procedures and SLA to the internal website”.   
An interesting observation was made regarding the motivation for this type of education, namely 
that “that statement alone indicates that should something go wrong a person or department will 
get blamed. We must move away from that mentality and not only do things because it is required 
by law, we must do it because we want to”.  Hazard education programs could reduce perceived 
risks and levels of preparedness because people transfer the responsibility for the safety from self to 
others (Paton, 2003).  This then highlights the need to be c utious so that the responsibility for 
preparedness is not placed on particular individuals, but that the onus rests on all resources to 
educate themselves.  Disaster planning always requires some form of change in behaviour, and 
change is often difficult to bring about. Thus, getting preparedness measures developed, adopted, 
and accepted involves overcoming barriers that are often quite formidable. 
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7. Discussion 
Comparative analysis of the RDC and HA tests yielded a list of recurring issues.  The main proposition 
was to determine if HOT factors contribute to recurring issues and, if so, which factors and why? 
There is a special concern to identify the conditions that make it possible for unnoticed, 
misperceived, and misunderstood events to accumulate in a manner that leads eventually to cultural 
disruption (Turner, 1976). HOT factors lead to triggering events, and compound the adverse effects 
of crisis when it occurs (Richardson, 1994). Industrial failures have been linked to a myriad of human, 
social, technological and organisational issues (Chapman, 2005).  In a survey undertaken, it was 
found that companies are “still not making disaster preparedness a priority until they experience a 
disaster or data loss” (Continuity Central, 2011).  Institutions fail to learn that errors and non-
compliances mark the starting point of an investigation, not its conclusion.  The organisation also 
limits its remedial efforts to attempts at changing the behaviour of an individual staff member by 
blaming, shaming, naming, and retraining. But the fleeting psychological precursors of fallibility—for 
example, inattention or forgetting—are the last and the least manageable aspects of the error-
producing sequence (Reason et al., 2001).  Human, Organisational and Technological (HOT) factors 
have an impact on recurring issues, and the underlying causes have an impact on the ability of IT 
Continuity to manage recurring issues.  
7.1 Human Factors 
The human factors at play during the RDC and HA tests, and the impact they have on recurring 
issues, were assessed (Figure 15). 
 
 
Figure 15. Human factors impact on recurring Issues   The impact of Human Factors on recurring issues? 
 
Issues of legitimacy, i.e. the credibility of IT Continuity bestowed via senior management, influences 
credibility in lower levels of the organisation, as demonstrated by participants who felt that 
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credibility via education drives and communication should be instilled by managers. The following 
statement by a respondent illustrated this view: “Management needs to talk to staff on a regular 
basis about this; ignorant managers should be forced to take responsibility for their teams; provide 
the accountable line managers with enough information to understand the necessity of DR; they 
have to instil the awareness in their teams and DR must be in their KPAs and job descriptions (if not 
already there) “.  It would appear that the issue of accountability rests with senior management as 
well.  All communication around the RDC test is shared with senior management, both during the 
preparation sessions leading up to the RDC tests and the daily reports during the tests. Reports 
listing the corrective actions required to mitigate recurring issues for the next test are shared with 
and signed off by senior management.  Despite this, results of the survey highlight the lack of 
accountability, as respondents appear unaware that corrective actions are re-assigned to their 
teams. 
The research also tested whether management attitudes had an influence on how resources 
perceive and deal with DR, but the results are inconclusive on this aspect as most of the respondents 
had no view of how their managers perceive DR.  The percentage of respondents who indicated they 
did have a view was too small to be able to draw any conclusive ideas.  Management commitment 
does, however, play a role in contracting with the necessary resources for participation in RDC tests 
and DR overall.  The lack of time and the resource unavailability would indicate that this contracting 
is either not taking place or not successful, and manifests itself in the attitudes prevalent in the IT 
Continuity space, as illustrated by this statement from a respondent: “it is a side show, the sooner I 
get it done the sooner I can get back to the live environment”.  Based on the perception that DR is 
not part of the resources’ day to day tasks, it could be argued that lack of management commitment 
does negatively influence the attitudes of lower management. 
The research further tested whether the personal experience of a disaster had an effect on the 
paradigm with which respondents viewed preparedness for disasters.  According to Tekeli-Yesil et al. 
(2010), past experience of a hazard seems to be an important factor influencing individuals’ 
practices regarding precautionary measures.  This research confirmed that if the terms of reference 
are non-existent, i.e. that the lack of experience of disasters makes the concept surreal, it negatively 
influences the practices resources employ regarding continuity efforts. 
Responses to Question 3, about IT Continuity being viewed as an overhead, reveal a strong belief in 
the justification of IT Continuity as being necessary and important, yet, despite the criticality, 
preparedness is viewed with reluctance and apparent “apathy” with associations of being a 
“necessary evil” and “inconvenient”, hence it is entertained and done as a “side show” with “low 
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priority” and “secondary to production” (quotes taken directly from responses).  While this view 
seems inconsistent with the strong sentiment and justification given by respondents, it is consistent 
with the idea discussed above that the experience of a disaster is the strong factor which signifies 
the criticality of preparedness activities.  
One of the main themes which emerged from the research is the schism or divide between the 
importance of production and DR.   Because DR is done on an ad hoc basis, and is not part of BAU or 
daily activities, it contributed to creating the divide which negatively influences the priorities given 
to DR.  The other theme which emerged is the absence of slack, resources, time and budget which 
influenced the existence of recurring issues, and the unresponsiveness to mitigating errors.   
Lack of documented and clearly-defined processes was also indicated as a strong factor which 
encouraged recurring issues and also extended the time and effort to take corrective actions. A 
respondent made the following comment: “The backups failed because while they (Service Provider 
A) were backing up to disc, we started our process to backup to tape (Service Provider B), but their 
backups were taking longer than usual and we started our backups to tape while they were still 
backing up to disc.  Nobody informed us, it was never an agreed process, we always assumed that 
they would be done, because they are normally done by the time we start backing up to tape”. This 
lack of documentation extended to checklists which must be prepared for every task, as stated by a 
respondent: “Checks must be put in place to ensure all backups are included when we ship to the 
North e.g. develop CRON job” and “we need to test/check more often.  Pre-checking is poor and 
must be rectified”. In the absence of documentation, however, pre-checking is heavily reliant on 
existing knowledge and expertise. 
Processes which were not adhered to also caused IT discontinuity, as cited by one respondent: “we 
were unable to test the Investment Admin.co.za component.  Due to project changes, the required 
server was not built in the remote data centre. We must revisit the Change Management process 
and understand where the gap lies between making production changes and it being replicated to 
the North.  This should be part of the project deliverable i.e. a sign off requesting that the 
application must be part of the remote data centre”. 
Human error definitely plays a role in the creation of IT discontinuity, where processes are clearly 
defined, but humans deviate from procedures, as stated, e.g. “the operator deviated from standard 
DBA procedures and the DBA started a differential job in error”.  The net result of this particular 
problem during the RDC test was a loss of 10 hours, which delayed both IT and business testing to 
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the point that the test closed off unsuccessfully because not all the businesses could test in the 
constrained time-frame. 
The vital role of communication also emerged very clearly from the research, as seen from this 
comment: “Due to the Mainframe that had failed, not all the jobs had completed.  When the 
Mainframe came up, only the remaining 46 jobs were run.  No one told us where the jobs had 
stopped.  This resulted in un-built indexes on the mainframe databases which meant that data which 
appeared to be missing was in actual fact related to the indexes which needed to be rebuilt”. 
7.2 Organisational Factors 
Organisational factors evident during the RDC and HA tests, and the impact they have on recurring 
issues, were assessed (Figure 16). The study assessed the influence of legislation on IT Continuity 
efforts, postulating the lack of guidance from various standards and government as influencing the 
credibility of DR.  The lack of legislative guidance only influenced people where they were extremely 
involved in the governance aspect of disaster recovery, as one respondent stated: “It is extremely 
frustrating when there are so many standards and in South Africa we have no best practices to 
adhere to or any guidance from government in terms of what is relevant and appropriate”.   
 
Figure 16. Organisational factors impact on recurring Issues The impact of Organisational Factors on recurring issues? 
 
One of the respondents who participated in drawing up an IT Continuity governance document for 
Company X, commented on the lack of guidance from best practices relating to the minimum 
distance between a primary data centre and a hot site (a hot or sister site where there is real time 
replication), that the standards and best practices offered no guidance and resulted in conflict. The 
respondent gave an example: “In the United States the minimum distance for hospitals is eighty 
miles, but there is nothing concrete for insurance companies and especially nothing in the South 
African context.  I suggested 25 to 30 kilometers as this is generally the trend, but I cannot justify my 
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suggestion.  They look at me as if I have gone mad and hence people do not listen to me.  They 
continue to have conversations about the distance and bandy about figures like 12 kilometers.  I 
cannot vet them one way or the other, the best supporting information I can provide is to suggest 
that it (the sister site) is not on the same power grid”. The lack of guidance from best practices and 
standards is a cause for concern. The research results could not verify the belief that the global 
recession resulted in budget cuts which impacted negatively on DR.  Rather, it is the lack of proving 
return on investment, and hence the justifications of costly DR initiatives, which contribute to the 
attitude people have regarding DR.  
The centrality of IT to the business emerged as a strong factor in determining the relevance of IT 
Continuity.  DR was seen as an IT function which caused frustration when resources (including 
funding) could not be procured, because business was so far removed from DR. The business did not 
experience the impacts of DR failing/test issues, and hence did not see the need to invest more.  An 
alternate statement for this proposition was given by a respondent as: “the closer or more direct the 
relationship to disaster recovery efforts, impacts the perception of DR positively”, (what a dreadful 
sentence!) i.e. because IT is involved in the RDC and HA tests, th y are impacted by the tests, 
whereas business is not that involved and hence far removed from the tests.  Business perception of 
IT and DR is a potential issue for further investigation.   
The centrality of IT to IT Continuity tied in very closely with the point around assigning clear roles 
and responsibilities, where IT felt  Disaster Recovery was a business call since they also fund the DR 
initiatives.  It also came through clearly that the roles and responsibilities of the various service 
providers and the IT staff should be clearly defined.  During the November 2010 RDC test, the 
application data could not be rolled back to the test date because “the JES1 spool logs were cleaned 
after the IPL2 (UDB).  This used to be the old service provider A job for capacity maintenance 
purposes.  When service provider B took over, we (the DBA’s) monitored the logs and manually 
cleaned the logs, because the role was never clearly specified and we simply assumed 
responsibility”. Service Provider B was completely unaware of this function. 
 
                                                          
1
JES: JES (job entry subsystem) is a subsystem on z/OS of IBM mainframes that receives jobs into the operating 
system, schedule them for processing by z/OS, and control their output processing. 
 
2
IPL: IPL (initial program load) is the act of loading a copy of the operating system (z/OS of IBM 
mainframes) from disk into the processor's real storage and executing it. 
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7.3 Technological Factors 
 
Technological factors and the impacts they have on the RDC and HA tests were assessed (Figure 17). 
The incompatibility of the technology between production and the RDC, i.e. ensuring that 
technology is the appropriate fit for the task at hand, negatively influenced the attitudes people had, 
because the testing process became cumbersome and caused delays.   
 
Figure 17. Technological Factors impact on Recurring Issues The impact of Technological Factors on recurring issues? 
 
Technology between production and RDC which is not always ‘like for like’, affected the paradigm 
and legitimacy with which respondents viewed IT continuity efforts. A comment by a respondent 
was: “the Lab (RDC) must equal production, otherwise the test does not make sense”.  The IT 
continuity efforts were seen as fruitless (quoted from a response) when “the hardware is outdated, 
slow, potentially problematic and will most probably crack at the first sign of load” and negatively 
influenced attitudes toward IT continuity, as illustrated by the comments: “it is not capable of 
supporting business continuity” and “it is smoke and mirrors”.  When disparities exist between the 
types of technology in production and the RDC environment, they undermine the legitimacy of the 
DR capability as it “does not reflect our ability to continue with business in RDC”. 
Complex systems increase the effort involved in synchronising the production and RDC 
environments, as the findings highlighted a clear call for an architect to clarify the inter-
dependencies between systems.  This lack of visibility into the inter-dependencies between systems 
negatively impacted on the attitudes resources have regarding IT continuity efforts because of the 
frustrations experienced when a team hands over to the next team and errors are encountered. 
Testability proved not to be an issue, as only a small percentage of respondents indicated that they 
were severely impacted by the unavailability of the mainframe between tests.  Although the 
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mainframe in the RDC facility is only tested twice annually, all changes to the applications in 
production are backed up regularly and restored to the RDC environment.  Testability seemed to 
affect only the confidence of the respondents with regard to the changes: “changes made to RDC 
cannot be tested in full because all systems are available only in a RDC exercise”. 
Supportability was not deemed to be an issue. However, the lack of knowledge and trust between 
service providers was cited as a factor which hampers IT Continuity efforts and resolving recurring 
issues.  Technology skills, knowledge and experience of the individual, on the other hand, did affect 
the experience respondents had with RDC and HA tests.  The research had highlighted that the more 
experienced the individual resource had, the more value they were perceived to add.  A statement 
to this effect was: “DCN setup is manual tasks with knowledgeable people attending to it”.  
Comments were also made about the frustrations experienced when new resources stepped in who 
were not as efficient or experienced as the more proficient resources who normally test DR.  This 
may be a reflection of the additional effort required to bring the DR environment in sync with 
production due to incompatible technologies.  While this is not an ideal state, IT continuity efforts 
will always be constrained by costs.  DR per se, is usually a trade-off between 'good to have' and 
'must have'.  This is a very subjective evaluation, and is also dependent on budgetary constraints and 
management buy-in of the risk profile and mitigation recommendations determined.   
Generally, IT disasters were attributed to human error.  Although human error may well be the 
trigger which hastens or gives rise to an accident, organisational failures enkindle multiple causes. 
(Tense!)  By concentrating on human error alone, the systemic context in which the failure transpires 
is not considered.  Organisational disasters can be prevented, because disasters incubate over long 
gestation periods during which errors and warning signals build up. While these signals become 
painfully clear in hindsight, the challenge for organisations is to develop the capability to recognise 
and treat these precursor conditions before they tail-spin into failure (Choo, 2005).   
The recurring issues identified through this research are summarised in Figure 18.  Management 
attitudes (Organisational and Human) and the previous experience people have of disasters (Human 
and Technological), are the largest contributing factors to recurring issues.  These factors create a 
schism between production and disaster recovery which negatively impacts on the priorities 
resources assigned to disaster recovery efforts.  This divide is evident in past behaviour of the 
resources who have participated in disaster recovery tests, and explains their negative and often 
uncooperative behaviour.  Their irritation at being called away from pressing production issues and 
day-to-day operational tasks is evident in their comments and demeanor during the tests, and can 
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be attributed to the fact that they do not see the importance of continuity efforts because they have 
never experienced disasters, and management attitudes further reinforce these perceptions. 
Human factors such as accountability, communication, and focus; organisational factors such as 
resource availability, skills and knowledge, documentation, change management, IT driven DR, and 
processes; and technological factors such as the actual DR environment, directly contribute to and 
affect the experience of recurring issues.  The sub-classifications are interchangeable, e.g. 
communication, documentation, skills and knowledge, and change management, can be attributed 
to both human and organisational factors: human because individuals lack the discipline to create 
the documentation, and organisational because the organisation does not instill, support and 
demand these practices.  The exact classifications are a further potential point of research. 
The HOT factors certainly were not the only contributory factors to recurring issues, but they were 
the underlying causes of recurring issues.  The Company ignored warning symptoms and, by 
implication, allowed for the accumulation of errors which could culminate in a disaster.  It would 
also appear that HOT factors are responsible for the schism between IT production and Disaster 
recovery as well as influencing the priorities of resources (Figure 15). 
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Figure 18. Cause and Effect Diagram of Recurring Issues in IT Continuity (compiled from the findings) 
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8. Conclusion 
As the research has shown, Human, Organisational and Technological factors (Figure 6) produced 
recurring issues which can only be mitigated with strong IT Continuity Management practices and 
principles. The Conceptual Model (Figure 10) which was developed depicts this relationship, and 
highlighted the importance of effective IT Continuity Management principles.  HOT factors 
contributed to the inception and accumulation of errors.  The Remote Data Centre tests highlighted 
these errors and presented them as recurring issues. Accumulatively, they serve as warnings signs to 
the Company.  These warnings, when documented, produce a list of corrective actions which give 
the Company the opportunity to rectify the issues or mitigate the risks.  As highlighted by the 
research, corrective actions can either be acted upon or ignored.  If they are not acted upon, it 
shows either a lack of IT Continuity management disciplines, or poorly performed IT Continuity 
management. The unmitigated accumulation of errors might be triggered by a seemingly 
insignificant event which could spiral the Company into crisis or disaster.  Acting upon the list of 
corrective actions, would increase the credibility of the IT Continuity plans, and potentially lessen 
the impact of possible disasters. 
Technological disasters are potentially predictable (Chapm n, 2005), and following the line of 
thinking  that, if companies adhere to addressing the HOT factors which cause errors and heed the 
corrective actions, technological disasters can often be mitigated.  Disasters occur when hazards 
collide with vulnerabilities (Tekeli-Yesil et al., 2010), and when the vulnerabilities are made visible 
and a view exists as to what is wrong, disasters can potentially also be predicted.   When this view is 
actively managed via the IT Continuity Management principles, as proposed in the Conceptual Model 
(Figure 10), disasters can not only be predicted, but can be mitigated and managed down to 
tolerable levels, thus averting disaster altogether or, at least, lessen the impact that a disaster might 
have on a company. 
It is only with effective management of IT Continuity via the processes suggested in the Conceptual 
Model that the HOT factors could be managed down.  The Business Impact Analysis (BIA) serves to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of the business, the technical requirements and their 
relationship with each other.  This is a vital component in proving and justifying the return on 
investment within IT Continuity.  A Continuity requirement assessment as part of the BIA solicits an 
understanding of the business operations, and yields the output necessary to address the difference 
between the current state of the RDC environment and that which is required.  The risk assessment 
enables plans and mitigating strategies to be implemented to address the threats which exist.  These 
threats are not only related to the tangible vulnerabilities, but also the intangible softer issues such 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
Coursework and Dissertation Masters Programme: Information Systems 2010 
 
 
Page 93 of 112 
 
as apathy, low morale, etc.  The findings were valuable in that they highlighted what resources were 
frustrated with, and thus gave Company X the ability to address those frustrations.  The solutions 
strategy ensures that Enterprise Solutions are developed which will address the discrepancy 
between the technology deployed in the RDC environment and production.  These steps, taken 
holistically, will ensure IT Continuity maturity.   
Disaster remains a dilemma of sudden occurrence (which needs preparedness as the only way to 
reduce loss) versus infrequent occurrence (which means the priority of preparedness becomes lower 
compared with other hazards (Shaw et al., 2004).  Consistent with this statement, the problem with 
IT Continuity is that, unlike production, the consequences of the triggering event will not be felt 
immediately.  Unless the Company is spiraled into crisis where it needs to invoke the Remote Data 
Centre or call upon the Disaster Recovery plans, it will never feel the impact of unmitigated errors.  
The RDC tests revealed or highlighted the issues, but they are never felt tangibly by business.   
Formal IT continuity and effective IT Continuity strategies, as suggested by the Conceptual Model, 
have the following recompense, namely: It aids in minimising the disastrous consequences of a 
disruption on an organisation; it reduces the hazard of financial loss; it retains the positive company 
brand and provides clients and suppliers with the assurance that the organisation’s abilities and 
services are intact; it facilitates the recovery of a client’s critical systems within the contracted 
timeframe; it allows companies to fulfil the legal, statutory and governance duties imposed; it allows 
companies to assess their levels of conformity to global IT continuity standards and further allows 
companies to implement IT continuity practices based on best practices (Holmes, 2010). 
IT has become a vital part of conducting business in our technologically advanced world. Undeniably 
a business can practically not do without these components for extended periods of time. 
Employees, shareholders and customers have come to expect that information should be available 
around the clock. Even a minor disaster or disruption could cause irreversible damage to an 
organisation and its public image. To ensure that an organisation could recover after a disaster, a 
complete IT Continuity Plan should be in place. A complete Business Continuity Planning 
methodology should preferably be followed to ensure that such a plan is effective in protecting an 
organisation (Botha & Von Solms, 2003). 
The recommendation from this study is to ensure that Company X and other companies pay 
credence to the recurring IT Continuity testing issues experienced within their companies, as these 
issues serve as warnings that an IT failure could be difficult to recover from.  It takes one event or 
action to line these issues into a perfect constellation which could result in disaster.  The research 
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further recommends that the Conceptual Model developed be used as a guide or methodology to 
manage the HOT factors. 
If businesses are to remain competitive in our ever-changing economic and environmental climate, 
they must ensure the availability of their services, and be in a constant state of readiness with the 
flexibility to respond to any eventuality (Woodman & Kumar, 2009).  Effective disaster planning is 
not optional, it is critical for the success of organisations.  Should an organisation not make the 
appropriate plans and put the relevant mitigating factors into place, it risks losing vital computing 
resources which could bring the entire operation to a potential standstill and cause it to close its 
doors permanently (Al-Badi & Ashrafi, 2009).   
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A: Overview of the Analysis Process 
1. The RDC Tests and the HA tests yielded issues which were logged in the Problem Management 
Tool, and a sample of the report is reflected in the table below: 
Ref number: Issue Logged by: Assignee Group 
2228425 
On Demand: Server failed while accessing folder 
backup Ilse Van Beulen Application Team A 
2228426 Content Manager : IMS Socket Time out  Ilse Van Beulen Application Team B 
2228427 LID: Failed to connect to IMS Ilse Van Beulen Service Provider B 
2228428 NUB OMS: Jistel: Connection timed out Ilse Van Beulen Service Provider A 
2228429 
Unable to establish session : Req session failed. 
IMSP Ilse Van Beulen Service Provider B 
    
2229110 
SRV000548 - User says that server is not starting 
up. Deployment manager. Please investigate. Ilse Van Beulen Service Provider B 
 
2. Each issue was assigned to a category and, on a more granular level, to a cause within a 
category. In the sample below, Ref number 2228428 is expanded on: 
Ref number: Issue Logged by: Assignee Group Category Cause 
2228428 
NUB OMS: Jistel: 
Connection timed out Ilse Van Beulen Service Provider A Network Slow Response 
 
3. Each test contained in the study went through the same process. Once all 7 tests were assigned 
to categories and causes (incomplete sentence).   
4. A year-on-year comparison was done, and this yielded a list of recurring issues between the 
successive tests over 2009 and 2010. These issues then served as the basis for the questionnaire, 
i.e. they served directly as the basis for some of the questions such as: “Why do recurring issues 
occur?”.  The questions were adapted to suit the study, e.g. where I needed to understand why 
we experience recurring slow network responses, I had to postulate the question: “why do we 
experience slow network responses?”. However, to ensure that the question was generic 
enough so that all the service providers, service line managers and IT development could answer 
the question, I omitted the “slow network response” and posed the question as: “why do we 
experience recurring issues?” Where recurring issues yielded items such as Apathy, I needed to 
understand what the contributing factors were, i.e. did people not have enough experience of 
disasters, which came across as apathy, or could people just really not be bothered? I went to 
literature to elevate the HOT factor issues attributed to apathy to posing a question. 
5. All questions in the questionnaire were developed in the light of a perceived recurring issue.  A 
full list of the questions can be found in Appendix C. 
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APPENDIX B: Linking Propositions to the Literature Review 
Nr Question Propositions HOT Factor Literature Review 
1 Why do we experience recurring issues during 
DCN and HA tests and how do we prevent 
these from occurring in future? 
Research Question 1 -  “holes” or vulnerabilities are present all the time,  (Roberts, et al., 
2001). Pg.34.  
 A result of this phenomenon is that companies may ignore the 
warning signs and alarms because people associate them with 
testing or malfunction rather than with genuine emergencies 
(Chapman, 2005).  Pg. 35.  
2 Which factors contribute to resources not 
taking corrective actions which stem from 
previous DCN / HA tests?  
Research Question 1 -  Even when information is available, it is not always made use of, 
either because recipients do not attend to it, or because they fail 
to see its significance thereof (Nakamura & Kijima, 2008).  Pg. 33. 
 Man-made disasters, also known as technological or socio-
technical disasters, are those disastrous events which arise from 
human decisions.  (Shaluf et al., 2002; 2003b; 2003c; Shaluf, 2006; 
2007a; 2007b). Pg. 19.   
 A multiplicity of minor causes, misperceptions, misunderstandings 
and miscommunications accumulate unnoticed during the 
incubation period (Figure 3, stage II) (Turner, 1994) Pg. 27.   
3 IT Continuity is viewed as an overhead, 
protecting against something that may never 
happen and not contributing directly to ‘the 
bottom-line’. In your view, why is this 
statement justified / not justified? 
Proposition 3.1.2.3: 
Cost Justification 
Organisational  IT Continuity faces various challenges, the most conspicuous being 
that “like life insurance, IT Continuity is a ‘grudge’ insurance”, and 
since IT continuity is regarded as an expense which safeguards the 
company against an event which may never happen, it is 
problematic to demonstrate a Return on Investment (ROI) in IT 
continuity (Vision Solutions, 2009; Strydom, 2009).Pg. 13 
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4 Remote Data Centre: End of Life (EOL) 
Technology is used in DCN and thus the 
infrastructure is quite old.  Thus testing is not 
always like on like technology (servers of a 
later generation in production). Wat is your 
opinion of the statement and how does it 
impact on you? 
Proposition 3.1.3.1: 
Compatibility and 
Complexity 
Technological  The increasing complexity, rapid change and growing size of 
technical systems affects the capability of the designers to predict 
and supply the means to control, the relevant disturbances to an 
acceptable degree of completeness and consequently the ability of 
the operating staff to cope with unforeseen and rare disturbances 
(Rasmussen, et al., 1990).   Pg. 29. 
 Technological problems which include defective equipment and 
faulty design play a part in the creation and amplification of crisis 
(Richardson, 1994). Pg. 34. 
5 In your experience / view, what are the 
frustrations with IT Continuity? 
Proposition 3.1.2.1:  
Available Resources 
Organisational  Root causes of catastrophes are inadvertently embedded in 
operational systems, latent until an undesirable combination of 
events occurs.  This means that small problems can cascade into 
disasters if they aren't stopped by pre-planned organisational, 
technical, or procedural defences (Swuste, 2007;  Reason, 1990).   
Pg. 35.  
6 What must be done to alleviate the 
frustrations? i.e. How can we improve your 
experience with Continuity?  How do we 
increase the focus and commitment to 
Continuity efforts? 
Proposition 3.1.2.1:  
Available Resources 
Organisational  Failures and near misses can be seen as occasions for shame or as 
incidents to be covered up, but they can also be understood as 
learning opportunities (Turner, 1994). Pg. 30. 
7 What is your managers' view of IT Continuity 
efforts? How does this impact on / influence 
your outlook toward continuity efforts? 
Proposition 3.1.1.1: 
Credibility 
Human  In a survey done by AT&T (2008), one third of IT executives were 
unaware of what their continuity or recovery plans comprised of 
and many admitted that their respective companies had no plans 
in place pg. 12 
8 Have you ever experienced a disaster?  Proposition 3.1.1.2: 
Terms of Reference 
Human  human factors which can cause recurring issues e.g. experience 
(Reason, et al., 2001).  Pg. 29.  
 The ‘it won’t happen to us’ syndrome prevalent in large companies 
is an example of ‘rigidities in institutional beliefs’ posited by Turner 
(1976; 1994).  Pg. 31 
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9 Is IT Continuity justified? Proposition 3.1.1.2: 
Terms of Reference 
Human  Organisations continue to be complacent on the subject of 
continuity (Srivantaneeyakul, 2007) pg. 13 
10 The DCN tests are bi-annual and because the 
Mainframe is unavailable outside of these 
slots, testing between these phases is not 
possible. What impact does this have on you? 
Proposition 3.1.3.2: 
Trialability / Testability 
Technological  Therefore “fallible decisions” are part of the design and 
management processes, and the focus should be on ensuring that 
any adverse consequences are detectable and recoverable 
(Dekker, et al., 2008). Pg. 28 
11 Do you receive the necessary support during 
tests from vendors, managers etc. If not, 
please substantiate your answer 
Proposition 3.1.2.1:  
Available Resources 
Organisational  Organisational inadequacies (Organisational factors, Figure 6) are 
comprised of policy failures, insufficient resources allocations, 
strategic business pressure leading to a neglect of safety issues, 
communication breakdowns etc. Pg. 27 
12 What must we stop doing? What must we 
continue doing? What must we start doing? 
Research Question 2   -  Organisations fall into the incompetence trap and learn to do the 
wrong thing better. This period is characterised by sufficient time 
for all the minor events to interact and accumulate to produce 
major system failure (Shaluf et al., 2002b; Shaluf et al., 2003b; 
Shaluf, 2008).  Pg. 40. 
13 "IT Continuity is mandatory and the company 
can be fined if we do not adhere"…are you 
aware of policies, SLA's etc?  If not, what must 
be done to ensure that such awareness is 
raised? 
Proposition 3.1.2.2: 
Legislation and 
Standards 
Organisational  Patterns of responsibility and awareness of statutory obligations 
and communications between top management, middle 
management, and operational resources are often lacking (Turner, 
1976).  Pg. 32. 
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APPENDIX C: Questionnaire 
 Question 
1 Why do we experience recurring issues during the DRN tests and how do we prevent these 
from occurring in future? 
2 Which factors contribute to resources not taking corrective actions which stem from previous 
DRN / HA tests?  
3 IT Continuity is viewed as an overhead, protecting against something that may never happen 
and not contributing directly to ‘the bottom-line’. In your view, why is this statement justified / 
not justified? 
4 Remote Data Centre: End of Life (EOL) Technology is used in DRN and thus the infrastructure is 
quite old.  Thus testing is not always like on like technology (servers of a later generation in 
production). What is your opinion of the statement and how does it impact on you? 
5 In your experience / view, what are the frustrations with IT Continuity? 
6 What must be done to alleviate the frustrations? i.e. How can we improve your experience with 
Continuity?  How do we increase the focus and commitment to Continuity efforts? 
7 What is your manager’sview of IT Continuity efforts? How does this impact on / influence your 
outlook toward continuity efforts? 
8 Have you ever experienced a disaster?  
9 Is IT Continuity justified? 
10 The DRN tests are bi-annual and because the Mainframe is unavailable outside of these slots, 
testing between these phases is not possible. What impact does this have on you? 
11 Do you receive the necessary support during tests from service provides, managers etc. If not, 
please substantiate your answer 
12 What must we stop doing? What must we continue doing? What must we start doing? 
13 "IT Continuity is mandatory and the company can be fined if we do not adhere"…are you aware 
of policies, SLA's etc?  If not, what must be done to ensure that such awareness is raised? 
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APPENDIX D: Ethics Form 
Ethics in Research 
It is the responsibility of the student/staff to complete an ethics form that involves the human 
subjects, or research the may hold ethical consequences for the University of Cape Town. A 
completed ethics form should be submitted to the Ethics Committee by the student/staff to the 
faculty they belong to, in this instance Faculty of Commerce. The following documents should 
be accompanying the ethics form: 
 A full copy of the research design 
 The signed consent form by the participants 
 The interviewer should provide schedules, forms, instructions, planned question and any relevant material 
planned to be used in the study 
 
A. PROJECT TITLE:   Investigating Recurring Impediments to Effective IT Continuity Management                   
              in a South African Insurance Firm 
A.1 Name of Principal Investigators: Van Beulen Ilse 
A.2 Primary research methodology (outline the main research tool being use i.e. interviews, experiments, 
secondary data use etc.):  
Case study research utilising semi-structured interviews, studying and analysis of existing company documents. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS: 
In this section, please describe the characteristics of the individuals who will be participating in the study. 
(This includes interview respondents, experimental subjects etc).  
B.1 Gender, race or ethnic group, age range, location etc. 
There is no gender, race, ethnic group nor age discrimination. The interviewees will be taken from employees 
from the company used as a case study.  
B.2 Affiliation of subjects, e.g., institutions, hospitals, general public, etc. 
Employees and management of Company X. 
B.3 If human subjects are either children (aged 15 and below), mentally incompetent, or legally restricted 
people/groups please explain why it is necessary to use these particular groups 
There are neither minors, mentally incompetent, nor legally restricted people or groups participating in this 
study.  
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APPENDIX E: TYPE OF CONSENT 
C.1 What type of consent will be obtained from study participants?   
It will be a written consent form and with all the relevant details the person needs to know before the 
participation in the study. However, if participant is not willing to sign the consent form, the planned 
interaction will be terminated.  
C.2 If participants are required to sign a written consent form, please submit a copy of the consent from 
with your application. If there is no written consent, please provide a motivation as to why this is not the 
case. 
The consent form has been attached; it is called the “Interview Consent Form”.   
C.3 How and where will consent/permission be recorded? 
By interviewee reading the consent form, being explained and prompted questions concerning the consent 
form details by interviewer to ensure mutual understanding of the consent form.  
APPENDIX F: CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA 
D.1. What precautions will be taken to safeguard identifiable records of individuals? These questions also 
apply if you are using secondary sources of data. Please describe specific procedures to be used to provide 
confidentiality of data by you and others, in both the short and long run. 
Information that can be used against the organisationand people representing organisation will be masked 
during analysis. The data collected will be disposed of as soon as the analysis is completed.  
APPENDIX G: RISKS TO SUBJECTS 
E.1. Describe in detail the extent of any physical, psychological, social, legal, economic, or other risks to 
study participants you can foresee, both immediate and long range, and provide the rationale for the 
necessity of such risks.  
The employee’s privacy might be at risk due to employees perceiving certain things personal and private. 
Company have certain routines, operations and communication private and/or perceive private. Thus they 
might not want to expose certain aspects of their business due to privacy infringement.  
E.2. Where possible, outline any alternative approaches that were or will be considered and why 
alternatives may not be feasible in the study. Also outline whether and why you feel that the value of 
information to be gained outweighs the risks? 
N/A 
E.3. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: 
N/A 
 
Van Beulen Ilse‘s SIGNATURE:                            DATE:                               
 
 
 
 
 
